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Part I
Preventing Liquidity Black Holes
6
Abstract
Financial market runs are the equivalent of a bank run outcome 
in financial markets. They occur because traders have an incentive 
to sell when others do so. In our model, traders with market impact 
who are subject to a loss limit and face uncertainty about market 
liquidity sell in the fear that other sellers may beat them to the market. 
The result is a coordinated sell-off that leaves all traders worse off. 
Using global game techniques, we characterize a unique equilibrium in 
which this run outcome or liquidity black hole comes into existence. 
Counter to common intuition, we argue that traders, who are active 
in the same market and hence expose themselves to identical risks, 
may overcome these liquidity black holes through sufficiently strong 
financial inter linkages.
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1 Introduction
Recent events in financial markets painfully remind us of the wild swings 
markets can undergo and the severe consequences that they entail. They are 
also reminders of the costs associated with crises when these disturbances 
get out of hand. Episodes of high market distress axe often characterized 
by heavily one-sided order flow, rapid price changes, and financial distress 
on the part of many market participants. While large price swings occur on 
a frequent basis, they often revert just as swiftly as they appear. Others 
however persist and even feed on themselves gaining momentum as they 
develop. Because of their severity and persistence, practitioners have dubbed 
such instances “liquidity black holes”.
A striking feature of these periods is that they intensify in response to 
the reactions from market participants. This endogenous feedback loop has 
the effect of amplifying the initial shock and adding a snowball effect to 
it. Traders that are subject to strict controls and incentive constraints are 
particularly prone to act as catalysts for the sell-off in a falling market. 
Faced with uncertainty about market liquidity, traders must fear the breach 
of their loss limits caused by the selling pressure on asset prices by other 
traders who share similar concerns. Anticipating the reaction of other market 
participants, constrained traders act pre-emptively thereby setting the run 
in motion. 1 In our paper, we model this scenario quite closely and are able 
to characterize the financial market run in a unique equilibrium using global 
game techniques.
The intuition in this paper however applies outside the context of finan­
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cial markets and in the following we thus try to convey the idea in a simpler 
and perhaps more familiar setting. Specifically, the run outcome in our story 
may be likened to the problem faced by two bank robbers. 2 Suppose two in­
dividuals contemplate robbing a bank that safeguards a precious asset whose 
value depreciates over time. If the thieves successfully steal the asset, they 
hide their loot to collect it at a later stage. If the heist is successful, the 
bank robbers return later to retrieve the asset. However, there is a chance 
that the heist fails and that the bank robbers are arrested by the police just 
after they manage to stow away the asset. Both thieves know that if caught 
by the police, they will be separated and individually interrogated. If indeed 
detained, the bank robbers find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma. They 
will each be given a chance to implicate the other, in which case the "ratter" 
receives no sentence while the "rattee" receives the harshest possible sen­
tence. If each bankrobber blames the other, both are sentenced to serve in 
prison long enough to only enjoy the benefits of the remaining undepreciated 
portion of the asset once released. If both remain silent, each receives a short 
sentence and can thus enjoy a greater residual amount of the asset. Indi­
vidual rational behavior then leads the bank robbers to rat on one another 
spoiling the benefits of the loot for both.
Could the bank robbers do better? The answer to this question may 
depend on whether the bank robbers could find a way to credibly commit not 
to blame each other once apprehended. Suppose the bank robbers decided to 
hide and lock away the asset in such a way that the input of both were needed 
to retrieve it .3 Now each thief potentially also has a vested interest in seeing 
his accomplice go free sooner. By blaming his accomplice, a bankrobber
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forgoes a larger asset value in exchange for the benefit of serving a shorter 
sentence. Depending on the relative size of the loot and the length of the 
sentence, remaining silent may be in the best interest of both thieves. Our 
model will take this intuition and apply it in the context of a financial market.
Our paper is related to a large literature that has analyzed the implica­
tions of an interconnected financial system. On the one hand, it is widely 
argued that links between financial institutions may have destabilizing or 
contagious effects by facilitating the spillover of shocks from one institution 
to another (Allen and Carletti (2008), Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas, Parigi, 
and Rochet (2000) ) . 4 A common feature of these models is their reliance on 
an exogenous shock that causes a crisis to spread into connected institutions. 
Other explanations of contagion include wealth constraints (Kyle and Xiong 
(2 0 0 1 )), information spillovers (Aghion, Bolton, and Dewatripont (2 0 0 0 ), 
Dasgupta (2004), Flannery and Kaufman (1996)), liquidity constraints (Ko- 
dres and Pritsker (2002)), solvency constraints (Cifuentes, Shin, and Ferrucci 
(2005)) and incentive schemes of financial intermediaries (Schinasi and Smith 
(2 0 0 0 )).
A common conclusion of these models is that the failure of individual in­
stitutions can have adverse consequences for the system as a whole. An im­
portant channel through which these failures induce externalities is through 
the liquidation prices of assets. If the asset demand is not perfectly elastic, 
asset sales have the effect of depressing prices, which may in turn harm other 
market participants. Reasons for asset demand inelasticity are information 
asymmetry, limited participation or risk absorption capacity on the part of 
the buyers. The limited capacity of the market to absorb asset sales, an as­
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sumption that we use in our setup, has figured prominently in the literature 
on banking and financial crises (Allen and Gale (2 0 0 0 ), Gorton and Huang 
(2004) and Schnabel and Shin (2004)).
On the other hand, the extant literature holds that links between financial 
institutions that axe exposed to imperfectly correlated risks provide diver­
sification or risk-sharing benefits (Allen and Carletti (2006, 2008)).5 The 
evidence on portfolio holdings in the build-up phase of the crisis however 
suggests that if anything financial institutions held similar, highly correlated 
assets in addition to various linkages to each other. This is a puzzle for 
which no explanation has yet been put forward to our knowledge. This pa­
per tries to fill this gap by suggesting that the choice of strong interlinkages 
by financial institutions that face similar risks may in fact be an optimal 
arrangement amongst these institutions. In the extreme, this paper suggests 
that tightly connected institutions may eliminate market sell-offs caused by 
strategic trading when connected market participants hold similar or iden­
tical (perfectly correlated) assets. Recent empirical work suggests that the 
interbank linkage channel may not be as important in propagating financial 
difficulties as the extant theoretical literature has indicated so far. Sheldon 
and Maurer (1998) for Switzerland, Furfine (2003) for the United States, 
Upper and Worms (2004) for Germany and Wells (2002) for the UK esti­
mate the bilateral exposures among banks finding little potential for failures 
resulting from interbank linkages.
The closest papers to ours that model financial market runs are Morris 
and Shin (2004) and Bernardo and Welch (2004). In Bernardo and Welch 
(2004), the fear of future liquidity shocks produces a collective sell-off by
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investors to second best users of the asset resulting in depressed prices. In 
Morris and Shin (2004), financial traders are subject to a loss limit: they 
are fired when the value of their portfolio falls below a certain threshold. 
Selling by a critical mass of traders can then harm other traders by pushing 
their portfolio value through their thresholds causing a collective sell-off in 
anticipation of the potential breach. A market run ensues with a sharp 
drop in the asset price. In their model, a trader is uncertain about the 
loss limit of other traders. In our model, the driving force behind a run is 
the interplay of traders’ trading constraints coupled with their uncertainty 
about market liquidity, modeled as the limited risk absorption capacity of 
the market making sector. Again, mimetic actions of investors give rise 
to externalities, which further stoke and synchronize the actions of market 
participants.
To address these negative externalities and to minimize the cost of fi­
nancial crises, the system has responded by introducing regulation. Current 
regulation takes most prominently place in the form of capital requirements, 
which force banks to hold a certain amount of capital as a buffer against 
losses, depending on the riskiness of their assets. While the banking sec­
tor is already highly regulated and the authorities are considering extending 
their regulatory reach to hedge funds, recent events have shown that reg­
ulation may not be a panacea either. Proponents of this view argue that 
current regulation is ineffective in inducing banks to internalize the negative 
effects of their actions on the system and may potentially even exacerbate 
the problem (Borio and Drehmann (2008), Repullo and Suarez (2008) and 
Wagner (2009a)). Perhaps this realization has resulted in a recent proposal
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by Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008) for a market-based solution, in which 
the authors put forward the idea of capital insurance contracts that would 
pay off in states of the world when the banking system is in bad shape. The 
argument holds that such contracts would provide relief for banks precisely 
at times when their actions might otherwise cause the greatest harm to the 
system. In the extension to our base model, we offer a different market- 
based solution in which financial institutions take steps to self-correct the 
costly distortions that result from their individually rational but systemically 
adverse trading behavior.
2 M odel
Some of the features of our model axe based on Morris and Shin (2004). An 
asset is traded at two dates, and then liquidated. Time is indexed by three 
dates: initial, interim and final. The liquidation value of the asset at the 
final date as viewed from the initial date is given by
v +  z
where z and v  are two independent random variables, z is normally dis­
tributed with mean zero and variance cr2, and is realized at the final date. 
The realization of v  is common knowledge in the market at the interim date. 
Traders then view the liquidation value of the asset as having a normal dis­
tribution with mean v and variance cr2.
Two groups of traders axe active in the market. There axe two risk-neutral
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traders in the first group who can be thought of as proprietary traders at 
financial institutions. Each of them manages 1 unit of the asset. The traders 
face an incentive contract in which their payoff is proportional to the final 
liquidation value of the asset. However, they are also subject to a price 
constraint at the interim date, which may be interpreted as a loss limit. If 
the price of the asset is pushed through the loss limit at the interim date, 
the trader is dismissed with a (small) fixed severance payout b. This feature 
captures the notion that sitting on news and holding the asset in illiquid 
markets can produce a bad outcome for a trader whose decision horizon 
is shortened by the constraint. The trading decision of the trader reflects 
the tradeoff between keeping his position open and reaping the discounted 
holding gains from the final date against dismissal and the severance pay 
in the interim. While the price constraint is exogenous to our model, we 
discuss the contracting tensions that may determine such a constraint later 
and their relation to the extension of the model.
In the market for this asset, the risk-neutral short-horizon traders face 
a group of risk-averse long-horizon traders, the market-making sector of the 
economy. This second group of traders posts the residual demand curve 
facing the risk-neutral traders as a whole. We represent the market-making 
sector by means of a representative trader with risk aversion 7  who posts 
limit buy orders in the market at the interim date that coincide with his 
competitive demand curve. The liquidation value as seen from the interim 
date is commonly known to have a mean of v and variance cr2. The Gaussian 
uncertainty and exponential utility induce the market-making sector to post
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limit orders that define the linear demand curve
where p  is the price of the asset at the interim date. When the aggregate net 
supply from the risk-neutral traders is s, price at the interim date satisfies
p — v — Xs (1 )
where A, given by 7 cr2, proxies for the risk absorption capacity of the market- 
making sector. Henceforth, we interchangeably refer to A as market illiquid­
ity, market depth and absorption capacity. Since the market-making sector 
is risk averse and requires compensation for assuming the risky asset at the 
interim date, the asset price falls short of its expected value by an amount 
As. A higher A corresponds to a lower absorption capacity of the market 
makers so that sales by the risk-neutral traders have a greater price impact: 
the market becomes illiquid.
2.1 U ncertain  m arket liquidity
In reality, market makers dynamically manage their asset inventory over time 
and provide prices to the market commensurate with the assessed price risk 
to their trading book. To prevent adverse market reactions to their trading, 
market makers have a vested interest in keeping their inventory concealed 
from public view.
In our model, the absorption capacity of the market-making sector is
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hidden from the risk-neutral traders when they make their trading decisions 
leaving them uncertain about the state of liquidity in the market. While the 
short-horizon traders cannot see the market makers’ aggregate trading book, 
they have access to imperfect information about market liquidity. In partic­
ular, at the interim date, each risk-neutral trader observes the realization of 
a private signal
Xi =  \  +  ei (2)
where A has a normal distribution with mean y  and precision a. The id­
iosyncratic noise term of trader i is given by the random variable which is 
normally distributed with mean zero and precision and independent across 
traders and of A.
Based on his private signal about market depth, a short-horizon trader 
decides whether to hold or sell the asset. The price of the asset is determined 
by the residual demand curve of the long-horizon traders. The game that 
unfolds between the two risk-neutral traders yields the following payoffs. For 
each trader, the payoff to trading the asset depends on the liquidity in the 
market and potentially the trading decision of the other trader.
If both traders hold the asset, they receive its liquidation value at the 
final date and value it at its discounted value Sv, where 5 € (0,1). If one 
trader sells his asset holdings (s =  1 ) while the other holds, the seller receives 
the transaction price v  — A6 while the trader who attempts to “wait out 
the storm” is stopped out at 6 . 7 If both traders sell out, their payoffs are 
uncertain and driven by a random execution of their sell orders. The traders 
have no control over the sequence in which orders are executed. We assume
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that a trader’s place in the queue for execution is equally likely to be first 
or second. The trader who is executed first sells at the transaction price 
v — X while the trader who comes in second in line fetches b. In the case of a 
simultaneous sell-off by both traders, any given trader can therefore expect 
to fetch  ^(v — A) -I- \b.  We summarize the payoffs in table 1 .
Trader B 
Hold Sell
Trader A Hold Sv, 5v b, v — X
Sell v — A, b \  (v — A) +  ^b,  ^ (v — X) +  ^b
Table 1: Payoffs in the two-trader game
2 .2  E q u ilib r iu m
We now solve for the equilibrium in this trading game. The focus is on the 
traders’ decisions at the interim date. We first analyze the case when market 
depth is common knowledge among traders. Then, if market illiquidity is 
extreme, the game has unique outcomes. In particular, if market illiquidity 
is very high so that the highest possible payoff from selling is less than the 
lowest possible payoffs from holding, that is when
+  \ b < b  ^  X >  v — b
holding is the dominant action for both traders. If, on the contrary, market 
illiquidity is extremely low so that the lowest possible payoff from selling
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exceeds the highest possible payoff from holding, that is when
^ (u — A) +  ^ 6  >  5v <=$■ A <  (1 — 25) v  +  b
the traders’ optimal action is to sell the asset.
For intermediate values of A, the game has multiple equilibria and hence 
we can no longer provide a definitive prediction of the outcome. Specifically, 
there are two (pure-strategy) equilibria in which both traders either sell 
or hold the asset. This indeterminacy is largely due to the self-fulfilling 
nature of a trader’s belief in an imminent sell-off. If traders believe that 
the asset will come under attack, their actions in anticipation of the fall 
precipitate the sell-off itself. Conversely, if they believe that the asset is not 
in danger of an attack, their inaction spares the asset from attack, thereby 
vindicating their initial beliefs. Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) showed 
how introducing noise into the payoffs of such a game can relax the strong 
dependence of a player’s action on his belief about the actions of others and 
as a result restore uniqueness of equilibrium. Imperfect information about 
market liquidity achieves this in our model.
In the two-trader game, each trader decides whether to hold or sell the 
asset based on his signal A*. Trader «’s strategy is a function
A* i— ► {hold, sell}
that maps the signal realization A* to a trading decision. When illiquidity 
is expected to be extreme, a trader has a dominant action. When illiquidity 
is expected to be very low (liquidity is high) so that the price impact of a
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trade is low, a trader’s dominant action is to sell. Specifically, selling is a 
dominant action for trader i who observes a signal X1 <  A, where A is defined 
by
£?[ A|A] = ( 1 - 2  5)v  +  b
Conversely, when illiquidity is expected to be very high so that selling comes 
at a substantial cost, a trader’s dominant action is to hold. This happens 
when his signal is X1 >  A, where A is such that
Since both A and A1 are normally distributed, a trader’s updated belief about 
A upon observing signal A* is
E A|Ai
a y  +  PX  
a  +  /5
The critical signal values that determine the dominance regions are then 
given by
and
A =  ( 1  +  H j [ ( 1 - 2 i ) v  +  b ) - ^ y
For intermediate values of a trader’s signal that satisfy
( 1 - 2 5) v  +  b < E  A|A* < v - b (3 )
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a trader’s action depends on the trading decision of the other trader. Con­
dition (3) holds provided
5v >  b (4)
Using global game techniques, we can characterize a unique equilibrium in 
the trading game. A trader’s strategy is a rule of action that prescribes 
an action for every realization of his private signal. We will solve for an 
equilibrium in threshold strategies where the equilibrium strategy is given 
by
hold i f  X1 >  X 
sell i f  X1 <  X
A*
For trader i who observes private signal A1, the expected utilities of holding 
and selling the asset respectively are given by
uH =  [l — q (A1)] Sv +  q (A1) b (5)
and
=  [1 -  q (A*)] E  [« -  A|A*] +  q (Aj) ( ± E  [v -  A|A'] +  (6)
with q (A1) =  Pr ^AJ <  A|A*  ^ where the argument is trader i ’s signal realiza­
tion. q denotes trader z’s belief that trader j  sells conditional on receiving 
signal A*. X1 has a normal distribution with mean y  and variance ^ Us­
ing results for conditional distributions, we can derive trader i ’s belief about
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trader f  s signal having observed signal \ l as
' a y - \- (3X1 a  +  2/3AJ |Al ~Af
a  + (3 ’ /3 (a +  P) (7)
The common threshold A used by both traders is such that a trader who 
observes a signal equal to the threshold is indifferent between holding and 
selling the asset, that is when
1 -  q (X)] Sv+q (a )  b = [l -  q (a ) ]  E ^ v -  A|a] +q (a )  Q f?  [u -  A|A
+  5 6 
(8)
Using (7) and after rearranging (8), we can show that there is a unique 
solution to the indifference condition, which is illustrated in figure 1.
l
Figure 1: Threshold in unique equilibrium
P roposition  1. Provided ^  ’ ttere “  °"
rium in threshold strategies where the threshold A is given by the unique value
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that solves
<f>
\ v 2 \ ( a  + P ) ( l - 6) v - a y  -  p \ ]  
( r ( A  — 2 / ) )  =  — 1
'  ^ '  '  (a  +  (3) [(1 -  26) v +  6] -  ay  -  @X (9)
where $  (•) is the standard normal distribution function and r  == y j (a+20){a+f$)' 
There is no other equilibrium.
We have shown that if the two traders follow the switching strategy around 
A, a trader is indifferent between holding and selling upon observing signal A. 
To complete the argument for the equilibrium, we must show that a trader 
prefers to sell if his signal is below A and prefers to hold if his signal is above 
A. Figure 2 shows the result graphically.
A'
Figure 2: uH and us  as a function of trader Vs signal X1
Since AJ and X1 are conditionally independent signals of the common 
component A, XJ and X1 are positively related. If trader i receives a relatively 
high (low) signal so will trader j  on average. Hence, a higher X1 reduces the 
probability that A-7 falls below a given threshold: q (x) is decreasing in x, 
formally q' (x ) =  — <  0. Figure 3 illustrates the idea.
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Figure 3: Trader i ’s beliefs about trader f  s sell decision
In the following, we show that uH is monotonically increasing while u s  
is monotonically decreasing in A1, a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of 
the threshold equilibrium.
Trader i ’s expected utility of holding the asset after observing A1 is given 
by (5) and increasing in \ l given (4)
duH 
d \ i
= - q '  (A4) [Sv -  b] > 0
His expected utility of selling the asset after observing A*, given by (6), 
is decreasing in A1 as it is a weighted average with positive weights of terms 
that are strictly decreasing in A*. Formally,
dus  1 P 
~d>J ~  ~ 2  a  + P
2 - q ( y )  + q ' ( y )  
>0 <0
<o
where the term in the inner parentheses is positive for small A1 and receives
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vanishing weight, q' (A*), in the expression as X1 grows larger.
In this game, traders adopt a pre-emptive liquidation strategy. The in­
tuition for this result is that a trader anticipates the adverse consequences 
of a sale by his opponent. A pre-emptive selling strategy of the other trader 
must be met by a pre-emptive selling strategy on my part. In equilibrium, 
both traders adopt a pre-emptive selling strategy because the other does so. 
The fear of being left holding the hot potato and facing certain dismissal 
over it drives me to act pre-emptively to keep my chance of staying in the 
job alive thereby causing the sell-off. While pre-emptive selling is in each 
trader’s best interest individually, the traders harm one another in so doing. 
If the traders could coordinate on holding the asset, both of them would 
be better off: holding by both traders is the equilibrium with the highest 
possible payoffs for both traders if and only if
Our analysis highlights that it is their inability to credibly commit to 
one another not to sell that leaves both traders to cause the sell-off. The 
phenomenon of financial market runs is descriptive of episodes marked by 
a heavily one-sided order flow, rapid price changes, and financial distress 
on the part of many of the traders. Such phenomena have also been at 
the center of much debate in recent months on identifying the factors that 
helped spread and amplify the effects of the financial crisis. An often cited 
propagator are the inter linkages among financial institutions. The argument
which holds by condition (3) for the lower dominance cutoff since A >  A.
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held that while potentially beneficial for the diversification of risks, a closely 
interlinked system invites the evil of contagion: the more tightly intercon­
nected financial institutions are, the higher the chance that a shock could 
propagate through the system and bring an otherwise unaffected institu­
tion to its knees. Our analysis adds to the debate by demonstrating that 
benefits of an interconnected financial system may arise even in the case of 
perfectly correlated risks. In fact, we demonstrate that financial institutions 
with similar risk exposure may find it optimal to choose a critical degree of 
interconnectedness to eliminate the adverse consequences of liquidity black 
holes.
2.3 Cross exposures
In the game with two traders, we see that each trader individually has an 
incentive to pre-emptively sell the asset if he believes the other trader is 
likely to do so. Since both traders find themselves in the same situation, 
they act in concert thereby causing the sell-off. Each trader would be better 
off if he could credibly commit to the other not to sell. One way to achieve 
this commitment is to internalize the negative externalities that each trader 
causes the other by pre-emptively selling the asset. The effect can be achieved 
if the cost to each trader of selling exceeded the benefit. Then, each trader 
would no longer have an incentive to sell. We argue that sufficiently strong 
cross exposures are such a commitment device.
Without cross exposures, the traders are only concerned with maximiz­
ing the payoff of the asset. In this case, the trader’s benefit of pre-emptively 
selling is the higher expected exit payoff relative to holding. With cross ex­
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posures, the trader’s decision is based on his overall portfolio payoff. The 
trader’s decision reflects the trade-off between the benefit of recouping a 
higher exit price weighed against the cost of a lower value of his cross in­
vestment when the asset price is depressed as a result of the sale. When the 
cross investment is high enough, the cost to selling exceeds the benefit. By 
assuming a critical level of cross exposure, a trader can thus credibly commit 
to the other trader that he will hold the asset.
We may think of the cross investment either as a stake in the operation 
of the other trader or a stake in a mutual investment vehicle set up in the 
name of both traders. The model may thus provide a novel rationale for 
the creation of a “toxic asset superfund” or “bad bank” as initially proposed 
by former U.S. Treasury Secretary, Hank Paulson ,8 and more recently con­
sidered by his successor, Timothy Geithner,9 and the German Ministry of 
Finance. 10
In the following, we sketch a stylized extension to the base model that 
captures the intuition laid out above. Formally, we denote by Wi the cross 
investment of trader i. At the initial date, we assume that trader i arrives 
with an exogenously determined position of 1 unit in the asset and chooses his 
cross investment Wi to maximize his overall portfolio payoff. In this stylized 
setup, by choosing a stake Wi € (0 , 1 ), trader i exposes his overall portfolio 
value to the payoff of his direct asset holdings with weight ( 1  — Wi) as well as 
to the payoff of trader j ’s asset holdings with weight Wi. Table 2 summarizes 
the traders’ portfolio payoffs as a function of their cross holdings. 11
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T rader B
Hold Sell
T rader A Hold 8v, Sv (1 — 1 0 ,4 ) b +  w a  ( v  — A ), (1 — w b )  ( v  — A) +  w s b
Sell (1 - w a )  ( v  -  A) +  WAb,  (1 -  w b )  b +  w b  ( v  -  A) |  (v -  A) +  ^ 6 , |  (u -  A) +
Table 2: Payoffs in the two-trader game with cross investments
Table 2 shows how the cross holdings may alter the incentive for traders 
to sell. Conditional on trader B  selling, trader A's best response now depends 
on wa making holding optimal if
WA (v -  A) +  (1 -  w a ) b >  |  (v -  A) +  (1 0 )
or wa >  Since the game is symmetric for the two traders, we have 
wb  >  This choice of cross holdings results in the elimination of the 
(sell, sell) equilibrium leaving (hold, hold) as the unique (and overall payoff 
dominant) equilibrium. We assume that when Wi =  \ , i  =  A ,B ,  both traders 
prefer to hold.
P ro p o sitio n  2. There is an equilibrium in which both traders hold the asset 
and set Wi =  i =  A, B.
In the following, we discuss the analysis and its robustness.
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3 Discussion
The financial market run in proposition 1 is caused by the incentive of a 
trader to sell given a sale by his opponent. This coordinated sell-off leaves 
both traders worse off where the incentive to pre-emptively sell derives from 
the interplay of their uncertainty about market liquidity and their trading 
constraints. Such firm-internal controls and other incentive schemes arise as 
a response to agency problems within a financial institution, and have merit. 
However, they are no panacea and may even produce “pernicious effects” 
to use the words of Jean-Claude Trichet, the head of the European Central 
Bank (see Trichet (2001)).
One shortcoming of such controls is their effect of shortening the deci­
sion horizon of the traders. When traders face similar incentive contracts and 
risk management constraints, their trading behavior becomes more synchro­
nized with the risk of amplifying market outcomes. Changing the internal 
incentives may therefore appear as a way to mitigate this mimetic trading 
behavior. However, it is not obvious that firm-internal incentives could elim­
inate the run outcome and may not shift the problem elsewhere. Within the 
model, one may argue that sufficiently raising the traders’ severance pay b 
could dampen their incentive to sell. Such a contract however may not be 
desirable as it would create strong incentives for traders to gamble. Leaving 
the possibility of a solution by regulatory intervention aside, our analysis 
suggests that a market-based solution in the form of an optimally intercon­
nected financial system may bring about stability in a particular market 
environment. The key and surprising message is that sufficiently strong ties
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between financial institutions that face similar risks may achieve the de­
sired outcome by helping them internalize the negative externalities that are 
otherwise the result of their strategic trading incentives.
A real effect of financial market runs is the shortening of their decision 
horizon of financial institutions. In future research, we hope to investigate 
the consequences of cross exposures as an insurance device for the banking 
sector. In the case of banks, the shortened decision horizon in tuem may feed 
back into their ex ante investment choice and affect their liquidity transfor­
mation role in the economy. That is, banks may shy away from investing in 
long-dated, potentially illiquid assets if the costs to liquidation in the short 
run are high. The formation of sufficiently strong interlinkages may thus 
help reduce the short-run costs by eliminating runs and make banks more 
willing to act as liquidity transformers in the economy.
The analysis is carried out for the case of two traders. We use this as­
sumption as a stark simplification of real financial markets. Essential to our 
model is that the traders have an impact on the market price when executing 
their trades. While Morris and Shin (2004) have shown how liquidity black 
holes emerge in a market with a continuum of short-horizon traders, allow­
ing such “small” traders to make cross investments would not eliminate the 
run equilibrium. Using the interpretation of a mutual investment fund, the 
reason cross holdings lose their effectiveness as a commitment device in that 
setup is because the size of trader i ’s stake becomes vanishingly small as the 
number of co-investors increases (see footnote 11). The type of asset market 
we have in mind is therefore one that is dominated by a handful of large 
institutions, such as investment banks, hedge funds and other investment
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vehicles, which specialize in the trading of a particular asset, such as loans, 
CD Os or other structured products.
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A A ppendix
In this appendix, we complete the proof of proposition 1.
Since the left-hand side of (9) takes values between zero and one and the 
right-hand side is increasing and reaches two as A becomes large, a solution 
exists. Since the functions on both sides of (9) are increasing but nonlinear 
in A, we need to provide conditions under which they only intersect once. A 
necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of A is that the highest 
possible slope of the left-hand side is less than the highest possible slope of 
the right-hand side. Figure 4 illustrates a case where this condition is not 
met and multiple equilibria emerge.
l
Figure 4: Multiple equilibria
Since the slope of the left-hand side of (9) reaches its maximum at y 
while the maximal slope of the right-hand side is at zero, the condition for
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uniqueness of A becomes
4*(r (A-y))  |c < 4 —
d \  \  \  ) )  'x- y d \  (a
(a +  ft) (I — 5 )v  — a y  — PX
(  +  P) [(1 -  25) v  +  b] -  a y  -  PX I A=0
This gives the condition in proposition 1. This completes the proof.
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Part II
Disclosures, Insider Trading and 
Incentives
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Abstract
This paper models a disclosure-trading game between managers and 
shareholders. Managers engage in insider trading by optimally divest­
ing their shareholdings in the firm while making disclosures about firm 
value. Shareholders rationally set the share price based on the infor­
mation revealed via disclosures and insider trading. Our model en- 
dogenizes the decision horizon of managers in a disclosure game with 
verifiable reports. We investigate under what conditions joint disclo­
sure and insider trading lead to full information revelation. The model 
is consistent with several empirical findings and has implications for 
regulation.
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“One of the reasons w e’ve got Enron is because w e’ve been in­
creasingly outlawing insider trading, [but] insider trading is the 
most effective means of making sure a company that does the 
wrong thing is penalized for doing so.”
- Milton Friedman (2003)
B Introduction
One of the main roles of financial markets is the production and aggregation 
of information. In an efficient market, financial asset prices are driven by and 
react very swiftly to the arrival of new information. Public information in 
financial markets however often arrives through the disclosures of interested 
parties who have a material interest in the reactions of the market to the new 
information. These parties will seek to exploit their informational advantage 
when this information affects their objectives.
When shareholders employ managers to run their firm, managers in their 
role of decision makers inside the firm naturally receive and shape informa­
tion about the firm first. This information is valuable but not easily credibly 
communicated to shareholders. The reason is that managers have an in­
centive to strategically disclose their private information to the market to 
maximize the stock price of the firm when their compensation is linked to 
stock price. This incentive is especially pronounced when managers act my- 
opically and the full content of their private information will only eventually 
come out. As a result, not all available information is immediately revealed 
and hence not directly reflected in asset prices. The information asymmetry
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in the market can persist with adverse consequences for shareholders of these 
firms and for other market participants including managers and shareholders 
of other firms.
The arrival of timely and precise information is important for sharehold­
ers because their decision making depends on this information. For instance, 
Dow and Gorton (1997), Goldstein and Guembel (2008) and Subrahmanyam 
and Titman (1999) have argued that managers use the information they learn 
from stock prices to make better investment decisions. Chen, Goldstein, and 
Jiang (2007) find empirical support for this hypothesis. Bleck and Liu (2007) 
point out that more timely information helps shareholders pull the plug on 
investment projects with deteriorating fundamentals before they are allowed 
to worsen under the veil of agency conflicts. 12 This finding resonates with 
the quote by Milton Friedman and the vocal arguments of stakeholders dur­
ing the Savings Sz Loans and the recent subprime crises as well as the Enron 
and Worldcom affairs that suggest that the information about impending 
trouble could have surfaced much sooner had an adequate mechanism been 
in place that informed shareholders early on and allowed them to intervene 
before the crisis occurred.
This paper studies an intuitive and simple mechanism that may provide 
shareholders with more timely information about the value of the firm. The 
trading of managers in the securities of their own firm (insider trading) is a 
key part of this mechanism. To borrow the words of one of the earliest and 
most outspoken proponents of insider trading, Henry Manne (2005)
“This is not to gainsay that there are also other mechanisms that
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play a significant role in stock pricing, such as the explicit public 
disclosure of new information, [...] that occurs after some form 
of market signaling.”
In fact, this paper investigates under what circumstances disclosures and in­
sider trading in tandem may produce more information than each mechanism 
on its own. 13 Under these conditions
insider trading puts the manager’s money where his report is
Insiders are not generally interested in revealing their private information. 
In fact, when outsiders are uncertain about how much information insiders 
possess, insiders may opportunistically strive to exploit the private infor­
mation to their advantage. 14 The inevitable manipulability of and inherent 
leeway in accounting makes this possible and disclosures an imperfect com­
munication device. For instance, Dye (1985) and Shin (2003) show that 
this leeway coupled with uncertainty about the information endowment of 
insiders can induce insiders to strategically withhold information. While 
the resulting disclosures generate stock return patterns that mimic empirical 
findings (e.g. Black (1976)), it is unclear whether these disclosures would 
remain unchanged if managers were to simultaneously trade on their private 
information. In fact, the very attempt to exploit their informational advan­
tage via strategic disclosures may be uncovered as managers try to capitalize 
on their informational advantage through trading in the firm’s securities re­
vealing their private information in the process. 15 In this paper, we examine 
under what conditions this holds true.
However, concurrent insider trading and disclosures do not always lead
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to more information revelation when compared to each working on its own. 
Taken individually, insider trades are just as imperfect a source of infor­
mation as disclosures axe. In our model, trading does not reveal much, if 
any, information. In particular, when the competition for information in the 
market is too stiff, trading to reveal information may become too costly for 
insiders resulting in a lower informativeness of prices.
The model in this paper studies a mechanism that highlights the roles 
of disclosures and insider trading in revealing information, can shed light on 
some empirical observations, and has implications for regulation.
First, in the joint mechanism, insider reports inherit their partial effec­
tiveness from their role in isolation and allow the following interpretation: 
disclosures anchor the market’s belief about the trading by managers. When 
managers may not exaggerate but strategically withhold information furnish­
ing accompanying evidence that will be verified at a later date by a court of 
law, investors axe unable to distinguish uninformed managers from informed 
managers who withhold information. As a result, investors allow for this 
uncertainty when setting stock prices. This pooling feeds back into the in­
centives of the managers. A pooled stock price disadvantages an impatient 
manager who would like to divest his holdings but is unable to provide evi­
dence that he knows of little or no unfavorable information. To escape this 
trap of adverse selection, such a manager may signal his ignorance of unfavor­
able firm prospects to the market by retaining sufficient financial exposure 
to the firm’s value till the verification date. This intuition captures the role 
of trading in our model. Trading allows the favorably informed manager to 
add credibility to his disclosure by putting his money where his report is.
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In this sense, our setup also highlights how disclosure regulation and 
signaling interact. Disclosure regulation enhances the credibility of firms’ 
disclosures by imposing ex-post punitive cost on distorted disclosures. Effec­
tive disclosure regulation does not induce a deadweight loss because no firms 
distort their disclosures in equilibrium: the large ex-post penalty serves as 
a deterrent and is not actually triggered. In contrast, in a signaling equilib­
rium, a manager who learns of favorable firm prospects may choose to incur 
a real (wasteful) cost to reveal his information to the market. The model 
in this paper shows that when the market for information is not too large, 
disclosures and signaling work as complements in conveying information to 
the market. This complementarity obtains when reporting occurs at pre­
determined disclosures dates that are identical for all firms. Such disclosure 
schedules (e.g. quarterly and annual reporting dates) serve as a coordinat­
ing device. When all firms report at the same time, investors can use the 
information revealed through the reports to discern firms at a given moment 
in time. The comparability of firm disclosures is weaker or completely lost 
when reports do not arrive at the same time.
Second, the model suggests circumstances under which insider trading 
should be allowed around information-sensitive events, so-called “black-out” 
periods, which include among other events quarterly and annual earnings 
reporting dates. It is precisely around information-sensitive events that the 
information asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders is at its highest 
and the potential for reducing it greatest. It is then that insider trading 
could have the biggest impact. By prohibiting insiders from trading around 
these events, regulators shut down one channel through which more private
39
information could potentially be brought to light. Regulation hence prolongs 
the persistence of the information asymmetry in the market and prevents 
shareholders from learning important information early on to be able to 
take interventive action in a timely manner.
Third, our results can shed light on several empirical findings. Our model 
can explain the finding by Roulstone (2007) that insider trades and earnings 
announcements jointly explain stock returns. Roulstone (2007) documents 
that insider trades disclosed and executed prior to earnings announcements 
preempt news in the announcement and have a negative relation with market 
reactions to the announcement. Moreover, our model results resonate with 
the findings by Gu and Li (2007), who show that the stock price reaction 
following a disclosure increases when the disclosure is preceded by insider 
transactions, indicating that predisclosure trades add credibility to disclo­
sures. Lastly, our results are also consistent with the evidence presented by 
Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), who find supporting evidence for their 
prediction that stock price-based incentives in the form of stock-based com­
pensation and share ownership incentivize managers to publicly disseminate 
their private information.
Fourth, the model supports the recent efforts of regulators to set high 
penalties for accounting fraud (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). The deterrence 
of fraudulent accounting through (large) ex-post penalties is what guarantees 
the partial information revelation through reporting in this model. 16
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C M odel
The base disclosure framework, and its description henceforth, is due to Shin 
(2003) and builds on the binomial tree model that was first introduced in 
the option pricing literature by Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979).
Consider an economy populated with a large number of firms, each of 
which is headed by a manager. A firm undertakes N  independent and identi­
cal projects, the outcome of which cannot be influenced by the manager. 17,18 
A project succeeds with probability r and fails with probability 1 — r. A suc­
cess corresponds to an up-move in the tree that raises the liquidation value 
of the firm by a factor of u and a failure to a down-move by a factor of d, 
u >  d >  0, giving a final firm liquidation value after s successes and N  — s 
failures of
u3dN~s (1 1 )
There are three dates - initial, interim and final - indexed by 0, 1 and 
2  respectively. At the initial date, nothing is known about the projects 
besides the setup above. By the interim, the outcome of some but not 
all projects will be revealed to the manager. That is, with probability 0, 
identical across projects, the manager learns whether a project succeeded or 
failed; the probability of learning an outcome is independent across projects. 
At the final date, all uncertainty is resolved and the realizations of all the 
projects become common knowledge. The firm is then liquidated.
At the interim date, there is differential information between the man­
agers and the shareholders. A manager’s informational advantage is the 
number of project outcomes he and only he observes. Only the manager
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knows how many projects in his firm were successful and how many failed 
while the shareholders (and all other managers) do not. Instead, the only 
information available to the shareholders is the information revealed through 
a particular mechanism. We consider three mechanisms in turn: 1 ) an in­
terim report about firm value sent by the manager, 2 ) an insider trade of the 
manager, and 3) a combination of an interim report and an insider trade.
The first mechanism takes the role of a disclosure the manager makes to 
the shareholders. In this interim report, the manager is free to disclose some 
or all of what he knows, by exhibiting the project outcomes that have already 
been revealed to him. However, the manager cannot concoct false evidence. 
If he knows that a project has failed (succeeded), he cannot claim that it has 
succeeded (failed). In this sense, although the manager has to tell the truth, 
he cannot be forced to tell the whole truth. The implicit understanding is 
that the manager’s disclosures are verifiable at a later date by a third party, 
such as a court, that is able to impose a very large penalty if the earlier 
disclosure is exposed to be untrue, that is inconsistent with evidence made 
available by the manager. But how much private information the manager 
has at the time of disclosure is not verifiable even at a later date. So the 
manager is free to withhold information if such information is deemed to be 
unfavorable. 19
More formally, the information available to the manager at the interim 
date can be summarized by the pair (s, / ) ,  the manager’s type, where s is the 
number of observed successes and /  the number of observed failures. Figure 
(5) shows the private information s i =  (s , / )  the managers observe by T\ in 
the case of N  =  2 projects.
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Figure 5: Ex-post Private Signals s i =  (s, / )  at T\ when N  =  2
The manager’s disclosure strategy m(-) maps his information (s , f ) to 
the pair (s', / ' ) ,  giving the number of disclosed successes and failures, where 
the requirement of verifiability imposes the constraint
s' <  s  and f ' < f  (1 2 )
This constraint reflects the requirement that the disclosure takes the form of 
actually exhibiting a subset of the realized outcomes to the market.20 This 
assumption intends to capture the notion that managers have some degree 
of leeway in their reporting choice. In choosing his disclosure strategy, the
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objective of the manager is to maximize the interim share price V\.
The second mechanism is the insider trade of the manager. At the initial 
date, the manager is given ao shares in the company. After receiving the 
private signal about terminal firm value s i ,  the manager has an opportunity 
to trade shares in the market at the interim date. Any remaining shares 
the manager retains to the final date will then be paid out of the firm’s 
liquidation proceeds.
We assume the manager is motivated by maximizing the revenue he de­
rives from trading shares in his firm over time. More specifically, the man­
ager’s utility is the sum of the cash flow at the interim date, the number of 
shares traded ai at the interim share price V\ , and the discounted cash flow 
at the final date, the manager’s remaining position in the firm’s stock ao — a\ 
traded at the expected final-date share price V2
u (ai; s i)  =  a\V\ (a i) +  S (a0 -  a i) E [V2 (s2) |si] (13)
where 5 E (0,1) is a commonly known discount factor for final-date cash 
flows. The discount factor captures the notion that selling shares in the 
future at T2 relative to the present at T\ is costly. We interpret the discount 
factor as a holding cost common to all managers.21
Together with the differential private information across managers, it is 
this trading cost that forms the basis for the signaling game played through 
insider trading. The private information of managers shapes the differential 
signaling cost of trading through their expectation of terminal firm value. 
More specifically, a manager who observes s successes and /  failures by the
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interim, that is Si =  (s, / ) ,  values the terminal liquidation value of his firm as 
seen from the interim date at its expected value computed from the binomial 
density with success probability r
E[V2 (s2) \ ( s , f ) ]
=  usd,f [ru +  (1  — r) d\N~s~*
The third mechanism is a combination of the first two. The manager 
holds ao shares in the company and makes an interim report about the 
value of the firm to shareholders. We assume the manager’s objective is to 
maximize his share trading revenue over time by choosing his share trade 
and interim firm value report22
u (a i, mi; s i)  =  aiVi (a i, m i) + 5 ( a 0 -  a i) E  [V2 (s2) |si] (14)
Since the initial and the final share prices of the firm are based on sym­
metric information, the focus of the analysis will be on the interim price V\. 
The interim share price will be the result of the competitive interaction of 
managers who seek to optimally capitalize on their informational advantage 
vis-a-vis shareholders via disclosures and/or share trading. The shareholders, 
however, anticipate the managers’ strategies, and price the firms in accor­
dance with the information revealed by the managers’ disclosures and/or 
trading. This gives rise to a game of incomplete information. We will model 
the shareholders as a player (the “market”) in the game who sets the price
N - s - f  i  j y _ s _ f
=  usdf  £
n=o V n
(ru)n ( ( 1  — r) d) N —s —f —n
of the firm to its actuarially fair value based on all the available evidence, 
taking into consideration the reporting and/or the trading strategies of the 
manager.
More formally, the shareholders’ strategy is the pricing function
T h  Vi
where T denotes the particular mechanism considered, that is T G {o i, m i, (ai, m i)}. 
We ensure that the shareholders aim to set the price of the firm to its actu­
arially fair value by assuming that their objective in the game is to minimize 
the squared loss function
( V i - V i ) 2 (15)
where V2  is the (commonly known) liquidation value of the firm at the final 
date. In other words, the shareholders set V\ equal to the expected value of 
V2  conditional on the information revealed by the disclosure and/or trade of 
the manager.
The shareholders are assumed to be risk averse with coefficient of rel­
ative risk aversion a  (>  0 ,7  ^ 1). This assumption corresponds to the Von
1 —
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u (c) =  The pricing of the firm 
thus takes the form of a weighted average of future project outcomes weighted 
by the state prices. Each state price is proportional to the product of the 
probability of that state occurring and the marginal utility of consumption 
u' (c) =  c~a in that state, where the constant of proportionality is chosen so 
that the state prices sum to one. The state price at To for the outcome with
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s successes at the final date is
\  S /
rs (1 -  r)N~s (usdN~s) a
N
E
71=0 n
rn (1 — r)N~n (undN~n) a
\ " /
Hence the share price at the initial date is given by
N
E
s= 0
* J
rs (1 — r) 8 (usdN s) 1 — a
N
E
71=0
N
n
rn (1 -  r)N~n (undN~ny
-T v l iV[:ru1 a +  (1 — r) d1 a] 
[ru~a +  (1 — r) d~a]N
=  1
N I N
E
s = 0  \ s
ru 1—a (1  — r) d1- a  \  N ~ s
r u l~a +  ( 1  — r) d1-a J  +  ( 1  — r) d1~a
N
E
71=0
N
n
ru ( 1  — r) d—a  \ N —n
ru~a +  ( 1  — r) d~a J  \ r u ~ a +  (1  — r) d~a
=i
ru1 a +  (1  — r) d1 a 
ru~a +  (1 — r) d~a
N
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Defining the constant
r a ~  r u - a +  ( l - r ) d ~ a 1 }
we can write the initial share price as
Vo =  [rau +  ( 1  -  ra ) d\N
D Equilibrium
The analysis centers around the question of how and to what extent the 
disclosure and/or trading games reveal the private information of managers. 
The analysis is divided into four parts. The first part states the benchmark 
full-information equilibrium that results when all project outcomes are com­
mon knowledge. Parts two to four discuss the asymmetric information cases 
where the sole source of information is either the disclosure by the manager 
or his share trade, and where shareholders can potentially infer information 
from both the disclosure and the share trading by the manager.
D .l  Sym m etric inform ation
Suppose all project outcomes are common knowledge. Then there is no in­
formation asymmetry and the shareholders perfectly know the manager’s 
type. Neither a disclosure nor insider trading by the manager will reveal 
any additional information to the market. In this case, disclosure is redun­
dant, and insider trading plays no strategic role; the manager can choose his 
revenue-maximizing trading policy.
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Proposition 3. When all project outcomes (s , f ) are common knowledge, 
every manager divests his entire shareholdings at the interim date setting 
a f 1 (s , / )  =  ao for all s, f  when S <  Pp^'f^ • The share price equals V\ (s, / )  =  
usdf [rau +  (1  — ra) d\N~s~ f .
Intuitively, the manager divests all his shares at the interim date when 
selling shares at the final date is sufficiently costly, that is when V\ (s, / )  >  
SE [y2 f t )  I («■/)] or S <
When the realized project successes and failures are common knowledge, 
the full-information share price is computed from the residual uncertainty 
over the remaining project outcomes given (s, / )  by incorporating the risk 
aversion of shareholders in the form of state prices. Conditional on s realized 
successes and /  realized failures at Ti, the state price for the outcome with 
s +  k successes at the final date is
{  N - s - f ^
\ k
r k ( 1  -  r )N~s~f ~k (■us+kdN~8- f ~k) a
N - s - f
E
n = 0
N - s - f
n
\
r n (1  -  r )N~s~f ~n (us+ndN- s~ f - ny
Hence the share price at the interim date conditional on s realized successes
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and /  realized failures equals
N - s - f
usd,f
71=0
N - s - f
n
V i ( s J )  = /
rn (1 -  r )N~s~f ~n (■us+ndN~s- f - n) l—a
N - s - f
E
71=0
N - s - f
rn (1 -  r )N~s~f ~n (us+ndN~s- f - n) a
V n
=  usd,f
ru 1 a +  (1 — r) d 1 a
ru~a +  (1 — r )d ~ a
N - s - f
Using the definition of ra from (16), we can write and denote the full- 
information interim share price following (s , / )  as
Pa (s, f )  =  usdf  [rau +  (1 -  ra) d\N~s~f
where the subscript a  indicates the risk aversion parameter of the sharehold­
ers. Note that ra is lower than the success probability r for a  >  0 and equal 
to r  in the case of risk neutrality, that is when o: =  0. That is, the risk-averse 
shareholders attach a lower weight to a successful outcome relative to the 
case of risk neutrality. Conversely, when all project outcomes axe common 
knowledge and the shareholders are risk neutral, the shareholders place equal 
weight on the final firm liquidation value as seen from T\ as the manager. 
With a slight abuse of notation, we thus write p (s, f )  =  E[V2 (^2 ) I (s, /) ]  for 
the manager’s expectation of firm liquidation value conditional on observing 
s success and /  failures by the interim.
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D .2 A sym m etric inform ation  
D.2.1 Disclosures
The discussion of the disclosure equilibrium is due to Shin (2003) and we 
summarize the key features of his analysis in the following.
One immediate conclusion we can draw is that a policy of full disclo­
sure by the manager can never be part of any equilibrium when the only 
communication device is an interim report. To see this, suppose that the 
manager always discloses truthfully, so that the disclosure strategy is the 
identity function
since there are N  — s — f  unresolved projects, and the expected value of 
the firm is
But then, the manager’s disclosure policy is sub-optimal, since the feasi­
ble disclosure (s, 0) that suppresses all failures elicits the price
m i (s , f ) =  ( s , / )
The best reply by the market is to set V\ to
=  usd,f [rau -I- (1 -  ra)d\ N 3 f (17)
N - s - f - i
usd,f [rau 4- (1 — r a) d]N 3 ^
us [rau +  (1 — ra) d\N s (18)
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which is strictly greater than (17) for positive / .  Hence, we are led to a 
contradiction if we suppose that full disclosure can figure in an equilibrium 
of the disclosure game.
Having ruled out full disclosure, a natural place to turn next is to go 
the opposite extreme and consider the strategy in which all successes but 
none of the failures are disclosed. This is the strategy that maps (s, / )  to 
(s, 0). Shin dubs it the sanitization strategy in that the disclosure is sanitized 
by removing the bad news but leaving all the good news. The author then 
shows that this strategy can, indeed, be supported in equilibrium. Under the 
constraint of verifiability, the sanitization strategy is optimal for the manager 
whenever the pricing rule is monotonic in the sense that, if (s, —/ )  >  (s', —/ ' )  
then
Vi ( * , / ) >  Vi (» ',/')
Under the sanitization strategy, the manager’s disclosure at the interim 
date still leaves some residual uncertainty about the true value of the firm. 
The shareholders can only distinguish some firms, those whose sanitized 
disclosures differ in the number of reported successes. However, the share­
holders cannot perfectly distinguish the different firms. Those managers 
who observed the same number of successful but a different number of failed 
projects issue identical sanitized reports making it impossible for the share­
holders to distinguish them. The shareholders therefore allow for some pool­
ing between managers who are not always fully informed and managers who 
axe withholding information.23 The market reflects this residual uncertainty 
in the share price by discounting the potential future successes more heavily.
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Formally, risk-neutral shareholders value a potential future success at price 
q <  r
i—  Or
q = T^Tr
Higher skepticism, a higher 6 , leads to a lower valuation by the market, 
a lower q. When the shareholders are risk-averse and the manager follows 
the sanitization strategy, the share price is given by the conditional expected 
value obtained from a binomial density in which the probability of success 
of an undisclosed project is qa
V1(s) =  u’ [qau + ( l - q a ) 4 N- 3 (20)
where qa =  •
P ro p o sitio n  4. (Shin (2003)) There is a Sequential Equilibrium in which 
the manager uses the sanitization strategy. Moreover, in any equilibrium in 
which the manager uses the sanitization strategy, Vi(s) =  us [qau +  (1 —qa)d\ N~s
In this equilibrium, pooling is the result of the managers’ inability to 
credibly communicate their private information perfectly to the market. This 
inability hurts managers with more favorable information, who are unable to 
provide proof that they do not know of much if any bad news, and benefits 
managers with less favorable information. Given the ubiquity of share-based 
compensation of managers in reality, the natural incentive of managers with 
less favorable information is to exploit the information asymmetry in the 
market (and the overvaluation of their firm’s stock) by selling their shares 
before their true information is eventually and inevitably revealed.
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Our model (14) shows that the setup of the disclosure game in Shin 
(2003), that is the manager’s objective of maximizing the interim share price, 
can be interpreted as assuming that the manager acts myopically and sells 
all his shares at the interim date. In other words, in Shin (2003) trading 
is assumed exogenous and identical for all managers. Knowing that his 
true information will eventually come out, a manager who knows of more 
favorable prospects for his firm may however be willing to expose the value 
of his stake in the firm more to firm value in the future. If perceived as 
credible by the market, having greater exposure to future firm value will 
then reveal additional information. In the next section, we make explicit the 
game when managers both disclose information pertinent to firm value and 
trade on this information. Our model thus endogenizes the trading decision 
of managers in the model by Shin (2003).
D .2 .2  D isclosu res and insider trad in g
In the following, we construct an equilibrium that illustrates the roles of 
insider trading and disclosures in the disclosure-trading game. We will now 
show that firm value disclosures and insider trading together may be suffi­
ciently powerful to expose all the private information of managers.
P ro p o sitio n  5. There exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the disclosure-
trading game at T\ in which the manager follows the sanitization strat-
N - s - f - l
P a ( s , f + n + l ) —6 p ( s , f + n + l )  
Pa ( s , f + n ) - S p ( s , f + n + 1) shares at in-egy and sells a f  (s, f )  =  ao n
71=0
terim share price V\ [ p i T =  usdf  [rau +  (1 — ra ) d\N~s~ f , provided
6 <  pCsJ-1) * N ^ N  a n dpa { s j )  >  pa (s -  1 , / -  1).
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To illustrate the intuition behind the equilibrium, we analyze it in the 
simplest interesting case of N  =  2 and later discuss the general case.
The problem of solving for the equilibrium in the presence of N  =  2 
projects can be broken down into N  +  1 =  3 sub-problems, the structure of 
which remains the same in each one. The reason for this simplification is 
the disclosure channel of the game. In this disclosure-trading equilibrium, 
managers partially separate through their disclosures and fully reveal their 
type through insider trading. Since all managers report all of their observed 
successes truthfully, withholding any observed failures, shareholders can only 
distinguish those managers who report a different number of successes. That 
is, for any given number of disclosed successes, shareholders are left with 
residual uncertainty as to exactly how many failures a manager observed. 
Disclosures thus group managers into sub-sets. Within each set characterized 
by the same number of reported successes, the incentive of those managers 
with a lower number of observed failures to separate themselves from those 
with more bad news gives rise to a game of incomplete information played 
through insider trading.
In the model with N  =  2 projects, there are six types of manager as seen 
in figure 5. The first set is a singleton containing only the manager who ob­
served two successes (2,0). In equilibrium, he discloses his type truthfully by 
reporting two successes and divests all his shares at the interim date, that is 
he sets (a^T (2,0) =  ao, m ^T (2,0) =  (2 ,0)). Since no other type can mimic 
his report by the constraint of verifiability, the manager uniquely identifies 
himself via his disclosure. His trading therefore carries no incremental infor­
mation and the manager is free to choose his trading unconstrained by any
55
strategic concerns. Divesting his entire shareholdings at the interim is the 
manager’s optimal action given a sufficiently high cost of holding shares to 
the final date.
The second set contains two types of manager: (1,0) and (1,1). Since 
the structure of the game in this set is similar but less general compared to 
the one in the third set, we only present the detailed analysis of the third 
set here and return to the strategies of types (1,0) and (1,1) afterwards. To 
ease notation, denote by the superscripts H, M  and L  the manager types 
who observe no success and no failure s  ^ =  (0,0), no success and one failure 
s f  =  (0,1), and no success and two failures s f  =  (0,2) by the interim.
Suppose that all managers disclose sanitized reports in equilibrium (we 
will return to the equilibrium choice of disclosures below). An equilibrium 
that reveals the managers’ private information then exists in this case if 
the managers find it mutually optimal to choose distinct numbers of shares 
traded and firm value messages (a ^ ,m ^ ), ( a ^ m ^ )  and (af'jmf'), where 
m \ =  (0 ,0 ), i =  H , M, L.
In order to determine the existence of the share trading component of the 
disclosure-trading equilibrium, we need to show that every manager, within 
the set of managers who disclose the same number of successes, finds it op­
timal to trade a distinct number of shares given the trading of the other 
managers in this set. Full separation requires that three pairs of incentive 
compatibility constraints for each pairwise combination of managers be sat­
isfied. However, the number of constraint pairs can be reduced to two since 
separation between s± and and between and s f  implies separation 
between s± and s f .  The equilibrium share trading then results from solving
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a manager’s maximization program subject to incentive compatibility con­
straints for the trading of the other two managers in this set. Starting with 
the manager of type H , his optimal trade maximizes his trading revenue 
given that managers M  and L  find it optimal to reveal themselves through 
trading. Formally,24
max a>i pot (0,0) +  5 (ao — af4) p (0,0) 
of€[0,a0]
s.t. af4 pa (0,0) +  5 (a0 -  a f )  p (0,1)
<  afpot  (0,1) +  <5 (a0 -  af4) p (0 , 1 )
where af4 solves
max af4pa (0,1) +  S (ao — af4) p (0,1) 
a^e[o,a0]
s.t. a fV a  (0,1) +  6 (a0 -  af4) p (0,2)
<  0,0pa  (0 , 2)
In the first maximization problem, type H ’s optimal trade af4 should be 
such that type M  prefers to trade af4 shares at his full-information share 
price pa (0,1) rather than af4 shares at the higher share price of type H, 
pa (0,0). At the same time, af4 should also optimally deter type L  from 
trading af4 shares at type M ’s full-information share price p a (0,1) rather 
than ao shares at his full-information share price pa  (0,2). The reason that 
type L trades ao shares is that, given revelation of his type in equilibrium 
and him being the lowest type in this set, incurring a cost by holding shares 
to the final date is a waste for him. Type L therefore takes his least-cost
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action and divests fully at date 1. The solution (a f \  af*, a f )  to this program 
is then given by
Pa (0, 1) — 5p (0, 1)
Pa (0,0) — 5p (0, 1) J
p., ( 0 ,2 ) - 4 p  (0,2)
Lpo,(0,1) -  5p(0,2) ,010
or
ao
Pa (0,1) — Sp (0,1)
LPa(0, o) — Sp (0,1)
Pa (0,2) — Sp (0,2)
Lpa ( 0 , l ) - 5 p ( 0 , 2 ) J , “ 0
P a ( 0 , 2 ) - 5 p ( 0 , 2 )
Pa (0, 1) — Sp(Q, 2)J , « 0
Combining a f , af* and a f , we notice that
0 <  a f  < af* < a f  =  ao
since ^^(’o7)-7p(o/+T)1 ^  e  ■*-)> Provided holding shares to the final date is 
sufficiently costly, that is 5 <  . Equivalently for the subset of types
with one observed success, type (1 , 0 ) forces type (1 , 1 ) to reveal himself and 
divest fully by choosing to sell a number of shares equal to
di (1,0) =  a0
LPa (1, 0) Sp (1, 1) J
Generalizing to the case of s i =  (s, / ) ,  share trading in this disclosure- 
trading (D T ) equilibrium satisfies
N - s - f - 1
a? T (s > / ) = ao n
ra= 0
Pa (s, /  +  n  +  1) -  <^P (s, f  + n  +  1) (21)
Pa (s, /  +  n) -  dp (s, f  +  n  +  1)
So far, we fixed the disclosure strategy of the managers as the sanitization
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strategy. Sanitization is in fact (weakly) optimal in this equilibrium provided 
Pa (s, f ) > p a ( s —l , f  — 1). This condition ensures that type (s, / )  has no 
incentive to withhold an observed success. For example, in figure 5, type 
(1,1) does not find it optimal to report (0,0) given pa (1 ,1) >  pa (0,0). To 
see the (weak) optimality of sanitized reports, first observe that the disclosed 
number of observed failures is immaterial given full disclosure of all observed 
successes and separation via trading. In the separating equilibrium described 
above, the lowest type in a message set, ( s , N  — s), divests all his shares 
thus incurring no signaling cost. Since sending messages is costless, the 
lowest type is indifferent between withholding any of his observed failures and 
reporting his type truthfully. In this case, we assume the manager withholds 
his observed failures in case other set members tremble by disclosing a failure 
by mistake and selling an insufficient number of shares. This way, the lowest 
type could threaten to mimic any other type in the set of types with an 
equal number of observed successes should they not separate through trading. 
Given the disclosure and trading strategies of the managers, the market 
responds with the following pricing rule
Vi (a i,m i) =
uB [rau +  (1 -  ra ) d\ 
N - s - l
N - s
i f n T1 rPat(gin+l)-*p(«.n+l)’ 0  1 1  [ /3a ( s ,n ) - ( 5p ( s ,n + l)
n = 0
.(s.v/0
u3d,f [rau +  (1 — ra) d\N s *
i f  (  [ a / T 7  f  [ f r» (a ,/+ n )-* P (« ./+ w )  1 a n N  W  1  \ pa ( s , f + n + l ) - 6 p ( s , f + n + l ) '\
I I n  LP a ( s , f + n - l ) - S p ( s , f + n )  ’ 0  H  [  P a ( s , f + n ) - 6 p ( s , f + n + 1) J
\  \  n=U  *- J 71=0 J
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where the arguments in the conditions should be read as (ai £ -,rai =  •).
In words, within the set of managers who know of no successful project 
by the interim, managers reveal their private information by retaining “skin 
in the game” until the final date. This retention effect cascades from the 
manager with the most favorable information down to the manager with 
the least favorable information, who divests all his shares. Revelation thus 
comes at a cost, which is highest for the manager with the best prospects 
in this set and decreases in firm prospects to zero for the manager with 
the least favorable information. Therefore, the larger the subset of types 
who observe the same number of successes is, the more costly it becomes 
for the types with more favorable information in this set to separate from 
the other set members. While a (differentially) positive cost is necessary 
for signaling to work (otherwise holding to the final date is optimal and 
signaling breaks down), this cost may not be too large as it would otherwise 
discourage some managers with very good news from separating. Notice also 
that no restriction on the holding cost (in our setup) is necessary when the 
market is risk neutral, that is when o; =  0. However, assuming a risk-averse 
market expands the parameter set under which this separating equilibrium 
is played. The reason is that for some parameter values this separating 
equilibrium is dominated by a pooling equilibrium, which we assume is played 
in this case. This is because the share price in a pooling equilibrium is 
lower when the market is risk-averse and decreases in the degree of risk 
aversion. A lower pooled share price lowers the utility for the types with more 
favorable information relative to the separating equilibrium inducing play of 
the pooling equilibrium only under more stringent parameter restrictions.
In the case of TV =  2, there exists a sequential pooling equilibrium in 
which managers divest fully and sanitize their reports. The market’s pricing 
rule is given by
7r (s; TV) i f  (ai =  a0, m i =  (s, 0))
Pa (s, N  — s) i f  (ai ^  ao,m i =  ( s , /  >  0))
where 7T ( s ; TV) denotes the pooled share price in a type set of s observed 
successes and TV projects, and is given by (20). A necessary condition for this 
pooling equilibrium to be played is that the payoff in this pooling equilibrium 
to at least the highest type in a subset with s observed successes dominates 
this type’s payoff in the disclosure-trading equilibrium. This condition is
a f T (s , 0) pa (s, 0) +  5 (ao -  a f T (s, 0)) p (s, 0) >  a07r (s; N )
or
a i T M )  >  * ( s ] N ) - 5 p { s , 0 )  
ao ~  Pa (s , 0) -  6p (s , 0)
Satisfying this condition becomes a horserace between a f T and 7r and 
depends on the underlying parameters. For reasonable parameter values, 
this condition holds for N  >  TV, a statement about the size of the market. 
Condition (22) may not be a sufficient condition for the pooling equilibrium 
to be played in the general case of TV projects. For this to be true, similar 
conditions may have to hold for other set members. This situation resurfaces 
in the case of insider trading as the sole source of information.
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D.2.3 Insider trading
In this section, we comment on the case when managers do not make dis­
closures about firm value but only trade in the shares of their firms. We 
argue that the strategic trading by managers may not reveal all, if any, in­
formation. The outcome depends on the dominance of the separating versus 
the pooling equilibrium and resonates with results from previous research in 
the market microstructure literature by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Kyle 
(1989) and others. This strand of research has argued that insider trading 
does not reveal all private information of “insiders” because of the inability 
of the market to disentangle the insiders’ various trading motives, the in­
siders’ trades from the trades of other uninformed market participants, etc. 
While our model is stylized and excludes more elaborate features of financial 
markets, the basic idea remains that insider trading alone can be too weak 
a mechanism to reveal the private information of insiders. In our model, the 
reason insider trading may fail to reveal information is due to the excessive 
cost of signaling information to the market when the market is large.
As already described in the previous section, full information revelation 
via the play of a separating equilibrium may not occur. Note the similarity 
of the structure of the disclosure-trading and the trading only cases. In the 
disclosure-trading separating equilibrium, the type space is broken up into 
subsets of increasing size as the number of observed successes decreases as 
can be seen in figure 5. In the case of N  projects, the largest subset is of size 
N + 1. Within each subset (bar the singleton set {(iV, 0)}), separation occurs 
via trading. In the case when managers only trade shares, all managers (not
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just a subset) play a signaling game with one another. That is, in this case, 
the size of the type set is (N+1)(N+2) with N  projects. For N  =  2, all six 
managers compete against one another in the pure trading context while in 
the disclosure-trading case three managers play the signaling game in the 
largest subset with s =  0. The analysis of the insider trading game is there­
fore very similar to the case of the disclosure-trading game. The outcome of 
play depends on N  <  N  and parameter values satisfying conditions such as 
(22).
E Conclusion
The most important ingredient into decision making is timely and precise in­
formation. When shareholders employ managers to run their firm, managers 
in their role of decision makers inside the firm naturally receive information 
about the firm first. This information is valuable but not easily credibly 
communicated to shareholders.
This paper studies an intuitive and simple mechanism that may provide 
shareholders with more timely information about the value of the firm: the 
simultaneous use of disclosures and insider trading by managers. We charac­
terize circumstances in which this mechanism may fully reveal the insiders’ 
information and in those conclude that
insider trading puts the manager’s money where his report is
When outsiders are uncertain about how much information insiders possess, 
insiders can exploit the private information to their advantage. The very 
attempt however may be uncovered as managers try to capitalize on their
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informational advantage through trading in the firm’s securities potentially 
revealing their private information in the process. As a result, the model 
offers a mechanism that highlights the roles of disclosures and insider trading 
in revealing information, can shed light on some empirical observations, and 
has some implications for regulation.
First, in the joint mechanism, insider reports inherit their partial effec­
tiveness from their role in isolation and allow the following interpretation: 
disclosures anchor the market’s belief about the trading by managers. When 
managers may not exaggerate but strategically withhold information furnish­
ing accompanying evidence that will be verified at a later date by a court of 
law, investors are unable to distinguish uninformed managers from informed 
managers who withhold information. As a result, investors allow for this 
uncertainty when setting stock prices. This pooling feeds back into the in­
centives of the managers. A pooled stock price disadvantages an impatient 
manager who would like to divest his holdings but is unable to provide evi­
dence that he knows of little or no unfavorable information. To escape this 
trap, such a manager may signal his ignorance of unfavorable firm prospects 
to the market by retaining sufficient financial exposure to the firm’s value 
till the verification date. This intuition captures the role of trading in our 
model. Trading allows the favorably informed manager to add credibility to 
his disclosure by putting his money where his report is.
In this sense, our setup also highlights how disclosure regulation and 
signaling interact. Disclosure regulation enhances the credibility of firms’ 
disclosures by imposing ex-post punitive cost on distorted disclosures. Effec­
tive disclosure regulation does not induce a deadweight loss because no firms
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distort their disclosures in equilibrium: the large ex-post penalty serves as 
a deterrent and is not actually triggered. In contrast, in a signaling equilib­
rium, a manager who learns of favorable firm prospects may choose to incur 
a real (wasteful) cost to reveal his information to the market. The model 
in this paper shows that when the market for information is not too large, 
disclosures and signaling work as complements in conveying information to 
the market. This complementarity obtains when reporting occurs at pre­
determined disclosures dates that are identical for all firms. Such disclosure 
schedules (e.g. quarterly and annual reporting dates) serve as a coordinat­
ing device. When all firms report at the same time, investors can use the 
information revealed through the reports to discern firms at a given moment 
in time. The comparability of firm disclosures is weaker or completely lost 
when reports do not arrive at the same time.
Second, the model suggests circumstances under which insider trading 
should be allowed around information-sensitive events, so-called “black-out” 
periods, which include among other events quarterly and annual earnings 
reporting dates. It is precisely around information-sensitive events that the 
information asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders is at its highest 
and the potential for reducing it greatest. It is then that insider trading 
could have the biggest impact. By prohibiting insiders from trading around 
these events, regulators shut down one channel through which more private 
information could potentially be brought to light. Regulation hence prolongs 
the persistence of the information asymmetry in the market and prevents 
shareholders from learning important information early on to be able to 
take interventive action in a timely manner.
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Third, our results can shed light on and explain several empirical find­
ings. Our model can explain the finding by Roulstone (2007) that insider 
trades and earnings announcements jointly explain stock returns. Roulstone 
(2007) documents that insider trades disclosed and executed prior to earn­
ings announcements preempt news in the announcement and have a negative 
relation with market reactions to the announcement. Moreover, our model 
results resonate with the findings by Gu and Li (2007), who show that the 
stock price reaction following a disclosure increases when the disclosure is 
preceded by insider transactions, indicating that predisclosure trades add 
credibility to disclosures. Lastly, our results are also consistent with the evi­
dence presented by Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), who find supporting 
evidence for their prediction that stock price-based incentives in the form 
of stock-based compensation and share ownership incentivize managers to 
publicly disseminate their private information.
Fourth, the model supports the recent efforts of regulators to set high 
penalties for accounting fraud (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). The deterrence 
of fraudulent accounting through (large) ex-post penalties is what guarantees 
the partial information revelation through reporting in this model.
Finally, we admit that the above conclusions should be interpreted with 
caution as our model is a stylized formulation. First, the choice of a contin­
uous variable for share trading complicates the analysis and may eliminate 
otherwise interesting insights. Second, while the base model is very intuitive, 
its formulation in terms of discrete types also contributes importantly to our 
conclusions. These points underscore the difficulty inherent in the analysis 
of games with incomplete information.
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Part III
Market Transparency and the 
Accounting Regime1
1This chapter is joint work with my former PhD colleague Xuewen Liu with equal 
contribution by both co-authors. This chapter was subsequently published in the Journal 
of Accounting Research (see Bleck and Liu (2007)).
Abstract
We model the interaction of financial market transparency and dif­
ferent accounting regimes. This paper provides a theoretical rationale 
for the recently proposed shift in accounting standards from historic 
cost accounting to marking to market. The paper shows that mark­
ing to market can provide investors with an early warning mechanism 
while historical cost gives management a ‘Veil” under which they can 
potentially mask a firm’s true economic performance. The model pro­
vides new explanations for several empirical findings and has some 
novel implications. We show that greater opacity in financial markets 
leads to more frequent and more severe crashes in asset prices (under 
historic cost accounting). Moreover, our model indicates that historic 
cost accounting can make the financial market more rather than less 
volatile, which runs counter to conventional wisdom. The mechanism 
shown in the model also sheds light on the cause of many financial 
scandals in recent years.
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F Introduction
Market transparency is generally believed to be a key mechanism that re­
duces the information asymmetry among market participants thereby guar­
anteeing market efficiency. In fact, the opacity of markets was blamed for 
the cause of many recent scandals such as Enron, Worldcom and Fannie 
Mae. In cases like these, investors and regulators often discover pertinent 
information too late to be able to take measures to prevent a potential crisis 
from happening. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 may be seen as a direct 
response of regulators to such criticism. Moreover, as a central piece of the 
infrastructure of financial markets aimed at enhancing market transparency, 
accounting standards have become a key area of proposed reform over the 
last couple of years. One such proposal and central issue of the debate is the 
shift of the accounting regime from historic cost (HC) accounting to marking 
to market (MTM) with the objective of improving market transparency.
However, there are many voices against such a reform. The main reason 
for the objections focuses on the infeasibility of implementing the marking- 
to-market regime. That is, the so-called “fair value” is seldom available in 
reality. Ideally, if the true value of an asset or liability could be observed, we 
would use this as the accounting measure. Marking to market would then 
lead to first-best efficiency. In reality, however, market frictions prevent 
us from determining a fair value. Most markets are too illiquid to allow 
for timely and accurate valuation. The debate does not put into question 
whether marking to market itself is optimal. The issue is rather whether it 
is possible to implement such a regime. That is, the center of the debate
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is the feasibility of marking to market, not its validity. Plantin, Shin, and 
Sapra (2008) (hereafter PSS) write
“[...] a rapid shift to a full mark-to-market regime may be 
detrimental [...]. This is not to deny that such a transition is 
a desirable long-run aim. In the long run, large mispricings in 
relatively illiquid secondary markets would likely trigger finan­
cial innovations in order to attract new classes of investors. This 
enlarged participation would in turn enhance liquidity, a situa­
tion in which our analysis shows that marking to market becomes 
more efficient.”
The difficulty or infeasibility of fully implementing a marking-to-market 
scheme makes a mixed compromise unavoidable, whereby some items are 
recorded at historic cost while others are marked to market. The decision 
by the European Commission last November to endorse a mixed reporting 
scheme is evidence of a similar thought process.25 The prerequisite for find­
ing an optimal compromise, however, is to understand the advantages and 
disadvantages of different accounting regimes and their effects on market 
transparency. While understanding that the main difficulty of marking to 
market lies in its infeasibility, both academics and practitioners are not yet 
very clear about what the problems of historic cost accounting and the mech­
anisms are by which these problems are produced. The main motivation for 
this paper is to investigate these problems and their mechanisms.
In studying the accounting regimes and their economic implications, the 
first natural question to ask is what the difference between the accounting
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regimes is and why the shift from one regime to another matters. In fact, 
although the proposal to shift the accounting regime to MTM is a recent one, 
various forms of MTM accounting have already been practiced for centuries, 
particularly in the form of the so-called lower-of-cost-or-market (LCM) rule.
However, the implementation of the conservative principle like LCM, 
which is a “rule” rather than a “law”, depends on several factors: industry, 
market and country. First, LCM is seldom used in the financial industry, 
which has been a particular target of accounting regulation in recent years. 
Even in the manufacturing industry, the LCM rule is not applicable to long­
term, illiquid assets. For other assets, LCM is not implemented with high 
frequency (e.g. only seasonally or annually). In the interim, it is still pure 
HC accounting that is used. Second, a liquid market is necessary for the im­
plementation of LCM, a rare situation in reality. In fact, the lack of liquidity 
is the very source of difficulty of implementing MTM in the first place. Third, 
as Ball, Robin, and Sadka (2008) show, the conservative accounting practice 
varies across countries. In many countries, it is hard to strictly implement 
LCM. In order to highlight and study the difference between MTM and HC 
accounting, HC accounting in this paper is interpreted as HC accounting in 
the strict sense (that is without the LCM element).26
The main insight of this paper is that marking to market can provide 
investors with an early warning mechanism while historical cost gives the 
manager a ‘Veil” to potentially mask the firm’s true performance. That is, 
historical cost accounting is equivalent to granting a free call option to the 
manager. If the firm’s performance is good (that is its market price is high), 
the manager can choose to sell making the book value reflect the asset’s
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market price. On the contrary, if the asset’s market value is low, he can hold 
the asset and report a book value equal to the asset’s initial cost. Hence, 
however low the market value is, the manager has a “floor” in the book value 
- the project’s initial cost. At the same time, he can fully benefit from the 
project’s upside. This “convexity” in the book value is the typical feature 
of a call option. In practice, as accounting-value-based compensation, such 
as profit-based bonuses, is widely used, the manager has an incentive to 
maximize the accounting numbers. Hence he has an incentive to use his free 
option. We will essentially show that historic cost accounting will not only 
“incentivize” but also “enable” the manager to mask the firm’s performance. 
The manager has an incentive because he would like to keep a bad project 
“alive” in order to secure the convex payoff next period. He is also able to 
because he can hide the project’s poor performance by setting the book value 
equal to the asset’s initial cost.
Our main findings are two. First, our model implies a relationship be­
tween market transparency and asset price crashes under historic cost ac­
counting. Myers and Jin (2006) document that countries where firms are 
more opaque to outside investors have a higher frequency of crashes in as­
set prices. Our model can provide an explanation for such evidence. The 
idea is as follows: in a more transparent market, the shareholder is able to 
distinguish good from bad projects and hence achieve a first-best outcome 
by liquidating poor projects. However, in more opaque financial markets, 
the shareholder may have to let a poor project continue as the manager can 
use historic cost accounting to pool good with bad projects. Failure of the 
shareholder to discriminate good from bad projects at an early stage allows
bad projects to be kept alive and to potentially worsen in quality over time. 
The poor performance of these projects can thus accumulate and only even­
tually materialize at their final maturity leading to a crash in the asset price. 
This theory also sheds light on the cause of many recent financial scandals 
and their link to the different accounting regimes. In fact, such a link has 
already been suggested by a recent report of the Bank of England. As an 
example, the author cites the crisis of US Savings and Loans, which
“[...] stemmed in part from the fact that the (variable) interest 
rates on their deposit liabilities rose above the (fixed) rates earned 
on mortgage assets. The application of traditional accounting 
meant that this showed up initially only gradually through nega­
tive annual net interest income. While it eventually became clear 
that many S&Ls were insolvent, a fair value approach would have 
highlighted much earlier that, as a result of changes in interest 
rates, the true economic value of their fixed-rate mortgage assets 
was below that of their deposit obligations. Had fair value ac­
counting been used, it is likely that the S&Ls’ difficulties would 
have been recognised and addressed earlier, and perhaps at lower 
fiscal cost.“ - Michael (2004)
Second, our model will help clarify the debate about the effect of different 
accounting regimes on asset price volatility. Opponents of a marking-to- 
market regime often claim that this accounting regime would lead to greater 
asset price fluctuations than would be the case under historic cost accounting. 
At first glance, this statement might seem consistent with intuition. But is
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this statement necessarily true? To the best of our knowledge, no theoretical 
model or empirical evidence has so far been presented that shows the impact 
of accounting regimes on asset price volatility. As our model will show, the 
claim that a historic cost accounting regime makes financial markets less 
volatile is not strictly true. Historic cost accounting indeed stabilizes asset 
prices in the short term. Under the veil of this apparent stability, volatility 
actually accumulates only to hit the market at a later date. Put differently, 
historic cost accounting not only transfers volatility across time but also 
increases asset price volatility overall. This result sits in stark contrast with 
the common opinion about historic cost accounting’s effect on volatility.
Moreover, the model can, to some extent, provide a new explanation for 
the “Black” effect (Black (1976)). Under the historic-cost-accounting regime, 
we show that a low book value will be followed by high uncertainty and hence 
high volatility of the next-period return.
Despite the current hot debate and the practical importance of the issue 
of accounting reform, there has been surprisingly little theoretical and empir­
ical work done on the economic consequences of different accounting regimes 
for the financial market. The leading article on this topic is the PSS paper. 
The authors study the basic trade-off between historic cost accounting and 
marking to market. In their model, the main problem of marking to market 
comes from the illiquidity of the secondary market. In such a market, the 
asset price is endogenous and the true and fair value of the asset is hence 
unavailable. The paper mainly concentrates on the position of a financial 
institution. It sheds light on why the opposition of marking to market has 
been led by the banking and insurance industries. While we agree with PSS
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on the main problem of marking to market being its infeasibility, our paper 
mainly concentrates on the modeling of the economic consequences of the 
historic-cost-accounting regime, particularly its effect on asset prices, its link 
to market crashes and its interplay with market transparency. Other papers 
that study the effects of marking to market on financial institutions include 
Burkhardt and Strausz (2009) and Freixas and Tsomocos (2003).
Myers and Jin (2006) is one of the few papers to model the relationship 
between market transparency and asset price crashes as well as stock-price 
co-movement while providing evidence in support of their theory. In their pa­
per, using different proxies for transparency, the authors find that countries 
where firms are more opaque to outside investors exhibit a higher frequency of 
crashes. In comparison with their model, our paper builds on quite different 
premises and provides a new theory that explains the existing empirical ev­
idence. Moreover, besides making explicit the effect of market transparency 
on crashes, our paper models the relationship between the accounting regime 
and asset price crashes.
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004) examine the factors that deter­
mine corporate transparency at the country level. They find that finan­
cial transparency is lower in countries with a high share of state-owned 
enterprises. In addition, their findings show that corporate governance is 
more transparent in countries with higher levels of judicial efficiency and 
a common-law background as well as in countries where stock markets are 
more active and well developed.
Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) and Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu 
(2 0 0 1 ) study the relationship between the characteristics of financial markets
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and stock price variation. They show that R 2 and other measures of stock- 
market synchronicity are higher in countries with relatively low per-capita 
gross domestic product (GDP) and less-developed financial markets. Bushee 
and Noe (2000) analyze the link between corporate disclosure and stock price 
volatility. Compared with this literature, our paper analyzes the effect of the 
accounting regime on asset price volatility.
G M odel 
G .l The firm
Consider a firm that is owned by one representative shareholder. The share­
holder employs the manager to run the firm. The firm has only one ex­
ogenously given project (or asset). The project lasts two periods from To 
until T2  when it will be liquidated by the shareholder. The whole life of the 
project spans across the dates To, Ti, T2 -  to T2 . T2 -  slightly precedes T2 . We 
use T2-  to model our assumption that the manager is shorter-lived than the 
firm.27 The initial acquisition cost (or the market value at To) of the project 
is normalized to unity. The project yields no intermediate cash flows over its 
life. However, the manager can choose to sell any proportion of the project 
at Ti and T2 - . 2 8  The selling price is the market value of the project at those 
dates. The market value at T\ for the whole project is equal to 1 • (1 +  <?i), 
where g\ denotes the project’s growth rate over the first period. Similarly, 
the market value at T2 (or T2_) is given by 1 • (1  +  <71) • (1  +  2^ ) 1  where 52  is 
the growth rate in the second period. Moreover, we assume that the growth 
rates g\ and g2 are positively autocorrelated. Specifically, the setup for g\
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and p2 is g\ =  E\ and 0 2  — P9i +  £2 , where e\ and £ 2  are independent and 
both follow uniform distributions: E \  ~  U n if [—a, a] and £ 2  ~  U n if[—b, b] 
with a >  0 , b >  0 , p >  0 .
Two remarks about the growth rates g\ and 0 2  deserve mention. First, 
they are private information. The project is firm specific. Its intrinsic worth, 
and hence its market value, is only known to the manager; it is hidden from 
the outsider or only available to him at a prohibitive cost. Secondly, we use 
the assumption of positive autocorrelation mainly to illustrate the feature 
that the firm’s performance in the first period is a signal of its performance 
in the following period. 29
G.2 The agents
There are two types of agents in our model: the shareholder and the man­
ager. The first assumption about the manager is that he is shorter-lived than 
the project. Upon receiving his compensation at T2 - ,  he resigns and leaves 
the firm while the project remains alive until I 2 . We believe the manager’s 
shorter life relative to that of the project is a fundamental reason for the 
inefficiency caused by historic cost accounting. Since the project will be liq­
uidated at the later date T2 , its market value is unobservable to the outsider 
(including the shareholder) when the manager leaves the firm at T2_ . Hence 
market-value-based compensation is not available to incentivize the manager 
to maximize firm value (the shareholder’s objective). Conversely, suppose 
the manager was longer-lived than the project. Then the shareholder would 
be able to offer a compensation scheme linking the project’s liquidation value 
to the manager’s pay. In this case, first-best efficiency can be achieved.30
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Second, we assume that the manager is risk-averse with CARA utility de­
fined over wealth at time T2 given by U (W ) =  1 — e~k'w , where k denotes 
the coefficient of risk aversion. The shareholder is assumed to be risk-neutral 
for simplicity.
G.2.1 The information structure
The agency problem in this model arises from the information asymmetry 
between the shareholder and the manager. The manager as the insider knows 
the intrinsic value31 of the project at any point in time even if the project 
is not brought to the market to be sold. However, the shareholder as the 
outsider knows the intrinsic value of the project only when it is liquidated 
in the market at Prior to liquidation, the shareholder must rely on 
the firm’s book value from the manager’s accounting report, which depends 
on the particular accounting regime used, to infer the firm’s market value. 
Under historic cost accounting, the firm’s book value contains two parts. 
The portion of the project the manager chooses to sell is transferred to cash 
and therefore shown at its market price. The remaining part of the project 
that the manager chooses to hold is recorded at its initial cost. However, 
under marking to market, the book value of the firm is the market price of 
the whole project. If there exists a deep and liquid secondary market for the 
project, as we assume, its market price is exogenous (that is the firm will 
be a price-taker unlike in the setup of the PSS model). In this case, first- 
best efficiency can be achieved under the marking-to-market regime since 
the book value is just equal to the market value of the firm. There is no 
information asymmetry between the manager and the shareholder.
G.2.2 The compensation structure
The objective function of the shareholder is to maximize the final liquidation 
value of the project at T2 . As for the manager’s compensation structure, we 
consider different schemes. At this stage, we assume that the manager’s ob­
jective is to maximize the book value at T2 - .  We show later on that this 
objective is equivalent to the manager being given accounting-number-based 
compensation— a base salary plus a profit bonus (the profit at T2 -  is the 
book value at T2 -  less the book value at To (the initial cost of the asset) ) . 32 
We believe the assumption of accounting-number-based compensation, par­
ticularly profit-based compensation, to be quite reasonable.33 In fact, such 
compensation structures are widely used in practice, particularly in firms 
outside the United States. This is partly due to market inefficiency and 
illiquidity of some stock markets. Equity-based compensation may there­
fore cause even greater inefficiency not only in these countries. Even in the 
United States, where equity-based compensation is common, we still have 
good reason to believe that the stock price is significantly affected by ac­
counting information. The assumption that the manager tries to maximize 
the accounting value does therefore not appear extreme.34 Besides the mone­
tary compensation, we assume that the manager derives some private benefit 
from running the project. Hence he prefers to continue operating to liqui­
dating the project, all else equal. This assumption is the same in spirit as 
in Jensen (1986). The manager prefers to have more and bigger projects 
despite their being value destroying (negative net present value).
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G.2.3 The agents’ actions
In this model, the manager’s action is to choose a  (e  [0,1]), the proportion 
of the project he decides to sell at T\ and T2- .  At Ti, conditional on the 
specific a  the manager chooses, the book value of the project is equal to 
B \ i  =  a  • (1 +  pi) +  (1 — a) • 1 =  1 +  a  • pi, where g\ is the realized growth 
rate of the project in the first period. The first term a  (1 +  gi) is the book 
value of the part of the project that the manager chooses to sell, which 
equals its market price. The second term (1 — n) is the book value of the 
remaining part of the project the manager chooses to hold, which is recorded 
at its initial cost. Based on the book value BV\, the shareholder makes the 
decision to either continue with or liquidate the whole project by trying 
to infer the fundamentals g\. That is, the shareholder’s action is actions , 
where actions  G { liquidate, continue}. Suppose the shareholder decides 
to continue with the project at T\. Then the manager has another round 
of trading at T2 -  just before leaving. Again, he can choose to sell any 
proportion of the remaining project at that date. The reason that we limit 
the shareholder’s action to liquidating or continuing is because the manager’s 
action is unverifiable and hence noncontractable. That is, the shareholder 
cannot force the manager to hold or sell a certain amount of the project. He 
can only passively choose to continue or liquidate the whole project.
It is important to emphasize that the outsider can only observe the total 
book value 1 +  a  • <71. He cannot observe its two components separately: 
the sold part a  • (1 +  g{) and the unsold part ot • g\. In fact, no outsider, 
including the shareholder, can discern the project’s growth rate g\ by telling
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Event Description
1 The exogenous project is given.
2 ,6 The manager observes the project’s market value.
3 ,7 The manager decides how much to sell or hold.
4 ,8 The book value is disclosed.
5 The shareholder decides whether to continue or liquidate the 
whole project.
9 The manager receives compensation and then leaves the firm.
10 The whole project is liquidated.
Figure 6 : Timeline
apart the cash a  (1 +  g{) from the noncash item (1  — a). We use this setup 
to capture the fundamental difference between historic cost accounting and 
marking to market, namely that the shareholder cannot perfectly infer the 
market value from the book value.35 Otherwise, there would be no difference 
between historic cost accounting and marking to market and the choice of 
which accounting regime is employed becomes irrelevant. If this is the case, 
there is no need to debate the accounting regime reform.36
G .3 T he tim eline o f events  
G .4 T he decision rules
Our analysis will mainly concentrate on the agents’ decisions at time T\. 
Figure 7 describes the agents’ decision rules at date T\. Figure 7 also sum­
marizes all the key information of the setup outlined so far.
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Figure 7: The agents’ decision rules at time T\
The manager observes the market value of the project. Based on this infor­
mation, he decides how much to sell/hold to maximize his payoff linked to the 
book value at time Ti- However, when making his decision, the manager also 
needs to take the shareholder’s possible response to his action into account. 
If the manager’s action (forming a book value) results in the shareholder’s 
decision to liquidate the whole project, the manager is no longer able to go 
ahead with the project and hence cannot maximize his payoff based on the 
book value at time T2 . He is then remunerated based on the liquidation 
value at time T\. The shareholder uses the book value, which is a function 
of the fundamentals g\ as well as the manager’s action, as an (imperfect) 
signal to infer the firm’s true performance g\. Hence he makes the decision 
whether to continue or liquidate the whole project. His aim is to maximize 
the market value of the project at time T2 .
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G .5 T he financial market
In our model, different financial markets are characterized by different de­
grees of transparency. To each financial market corresponds an “uninformed 
window” as shown in figure 8 . The more transparent the financial market 
is, the smaller the “uninformed window” will be. In our setup, where the 
project’s return is uniformly distributed over the interval [—a,a], we de­
fine the uninformed window as the subset [—a \ a'] (0 <  a' <  a). We assume 
that the outsider can perfectly observe the true value of states in the case 
of extreme return realizations (very high or very low) that fall outside the 
uninformed window. However, any given ex-post return sampled inside the 
uninformed window, the shareholder cannot distinguish from other returns 
in the uninformed window. The shareholder thus has to rely on the man­
ager’s accounting report for more information. The idea of defining an un­
informed window can be described as follows. In every financial market, we 
can classify two kinds of communication channels between shareholders and 
management: accounting and non-accounting reports. The non-accounting 
channel is more powerful in transparent markets than in opaque ones. In 
fact, in more transparent financial markets like the United States, there is a 
greater analyst and media coverage through such institutions as investment 
banks and rating agencies for instance. All these non-accounting channels 
make the shareholder less dependent on the manager’s accounting report. 
Hence, the uninformed window, within which the shareholder has to rely 
on the manager’s accounting report, is shorter.37 We also use figure 8  to 
illustrate the setup of the financial market. Without loss of generality, we
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Entire Interval Most opaque Less opaque Least opaque 
of return market market market
a 1
a ~ a
a 1
~ u
Uninformed Window
Figure 8 : The financial market with different degrees of transparency 
For the same project whose return is uniformly distributed in the interval 
[—a,a], the less opaque financial market has a shorter uninformed window 
[—a', a'], within which the shareholder has to rely on the accounting state­
ment (the book value). Outside the uninformed window, the shareholder 
knows the true state.
normalize the riskfree interest rate in the economy to zero.
H Equilibrium
As figure 7 shows, the agents’ actions are not independent but there indeed 
exists a strategic dimension to their decision-making process. In fact, the 
interplay of their actions constitutes a sequential game between the share­
holder and the manager. Solving for the equilibrium of the game is equivalent 
to finding the equilibrium strategy profile of the agents ( / ,  h). We formalize 
the agents’ strategies in definition 6 .
D efin ition  6 . (Strategies) The manager’s strategy at time T\ is the function
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/ ,  which is a map from the first period’s return g\ to the proportion of the 
asset he chooses to sell a, that is a  =  f (g i) . The shareholder’s strategy 
is given by the function h, which maps the book value at time T\ to the 
set {liquidate, continue}. That is, actions  =  h{BV\), where actions  €E 
{liquidate, continue}.
It is important to note that the equilibrium does not only depend on 
the accounting scheme but also on the degree of transparency of the fi­
nancial market. The degree of transparency determines the length of the 
uninformed window, which in turn determines the manager’s capability to 
mask the firm’s true performance. Recall that the shareholder is perfectly 
informed, that is, his action does not depend on the disclosure of accounting 
information, when the economic fundamentals are recorded outside the un­
informed window. Theorem 7 states the first type of equilibrium - a pooling 
equilibrium, which occurs in sufficiently opaque financial markets where the 
uninformed window is large. The proof of the theorem is provided later on.
T heorem  7. (Pooling Equilibrium) When a! >  a* (b ,p ,k ), the strategy pro­
file s =  (f ,h ) at time T\ constitutes a Nash Equilibrium, where f  and h 
satisfy
f  (9 i) =  <
argmaxi? [U (m ax{l +  agi, a ( l  +  px) +  (1 -  a ) ( l  +  g i) { l  +  ^2)})]
a€[0,l]
0
and
continue when BV\ >  1
h {B V i) =  <
liquidate when B \ i  <  1
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when g \ > 0  
when gi <  0
In this equilibrium, the manager sells nothing (that is f  (gi) =  0) if 
and only if pi falls in two extreme intervals, that is gi E [—a', a] U [a, a']. In 
the middle interval [a,a], the manager partially liquidates the project, where 
a* =  [ |  (a2 — a2) +  \  (a3 — a3) ] 5 , a solves | e- fc(1+“)(1+Pa+b) • [1 +  A; (1  +  a) (ap +  6 )] 
_ e - f c ( i + a ) ( i + p a - 6 )  . [i +  fc(l +  a )  (ap —  6 )]} x 2 b f c ( i+ t ) =  ® -  safisfies
- k& e- k ^ ± ^ M l ± £  +  _ ^ [e-K X + a ) ^ l>a+ l , ) _ e - k +  k ( 1  +  &) { m  +  b ) . 
e - k ( l + a ) ( l + p a + b )  +  ^ . e -fc] =  o .
It is worth noting that the pooling equilibrium here is to be interpreted 
in the sense that the shareholder always continues the project, as opposed 
to the result in theorem 8  below where the firm is efficiently liquidated when 
pi <  0. The basic idea of the pooling equilibrium can be explained as follows.
When the project’s return in the first period pi is non-negative, the manager 
does not need to worry that the shareholder will liquidate the project. The 
manager can maximize his own expected utility without giving any consider­
ation to the shareholder’s interference. However, when the project’s return 
pi is negative, the manager knows that the shareholder will definitely liqui­
date the whole project if the manager sells only a tiny fraction. It is thus 
optimal for the manager to set a  =  0 . This is the manager’s strategy. As 
for the shareholder, if he observes a book value strictly higher (lower) than 
unity, he can perfectly infer the project’s return being positive (negative).
Hence his dominant strategy is to continue (liquidate). Observing a book 
value of unity, he knows the project could be either very good or very bad.
But if the uninformed window is sufficiently large (that is a' >  a* (b ,p ,k )), 
as we assume in theorem 7, the gain of continuing potentially good projects 
will dominate the loss of not liquidating bad projects. The shareholder’s op-
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timal strategy is then to continue resulting in bad and good projects being 
pooled. In summary, the shareholder will continue the whole project if the 
book value is not less than unity. Otherwise he is going to liquidate the 
project.
Before proceeding to the proof of theorem 7, we use some diagrams cre­
ated via numerical simulations of the agents’ optimal strategies to help us 
understand the intuition behind the equilibrium. First, consider the man­
ager’s strategy. In figure 9, the bottom diagram represents the manager’s 
strategy, the optimal sale a  as a function of the fundamentals g \ . This is a 
non-monotonic function. The manager sets a  =  0 (that is holds everything) 
when gi is very low or very high selling partially when g\ is fairly high. It 
is worth noting that the optimal a  is the result of two different consider­
ations by the manager. When g\ >  0, a  is the solution to the manager’s 
utility maximization problem. In this case, he needs not be concerned with 
the shareholder’s liquidating the firm as we will show later. When g\ <  0, 
the manager’s decision to sell nothing is given by his strategic considera­
tion. The reason for his action is that he must otherwise fear the firm’s 
forced liquidation by the shareholder, which would thwart the manager’s 
chance of upside compensation at time T2 - .  Following the manager’s ac­
tion (that is choosing o;), the shareholder can access the firm’s accounting 
statements and observe its book value as shown in the top diagram of figure 
9. Note that the book value is a bell-shaped function of the fundamentals. 
The book value is just a simple function of the manager’s action (that is 
BV l =  a (l-f-< 7i) +  ( l  — a) =  1 +  a<7i). In this diagram, we can see a pattern 
similar to the “Black” effect. That is, the higher the first-period expected
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Figure 9: The manager’s strategy in the pooling equilibrium
return, the higher the volatility (uncertainty) of the next-period return. The 
shareholder uses the book value information to try to infer the fundamen­
tals, that is, gi =  f ~ l {BV i). For a book value (y-axis) greater than unity, 
there are two corresponding values of g\ (x-axis). As the book value de­
creases, the distance between the two g\, which measures the uncertainty 
of the fundamentals, increases. Particularly, at a book value equal to unity, 
the corresponding g\ falls into two intervals. At this point, the shareholder’s 
uncertainty is at its highest.
Next consider the shareholder’s strategy. Conditional on the book value 
he observes, the shareholder is uncertain about the economic fundamentals. 
The top diagram in figure 10 plots his position. Particularly when he observes
a book value of unity, the fundamental value may be any g\ € [—a', a]U[a, a' ] . 
This degree of uncertainty makes the shareholder’s optimal strategy not obvi­
ous. The bottom diagram in figure 10 depicts the shareholder’s payoffs of the 
two alternative choices (liquidate or continue) as functions of the fundamen­
tals. Suppose the shareholder knows that the return falls inside [0, a] U [a, a']. 
In this case, his strategy to continue with the project dominates the decision 
to liquidate the firm early. However, if g\ falls in the interval [—a7, 0], liqui­
dation is the dominant strategy. Faced with uncertainty, the shareholder’s 
strategy is to compare the potential gain (the area ADHIE +AA BC ) with 
the potential loss (the area AALM) of a given strategy. The result of the 
comparison depends on the length of uninformed window. The bigger the 
uninformed window (a') is, the higher the possibility that continue becomes 
the dominant strategy, a* is the threshold. If o' >  a*, the shareholder will 
let the project continue, which corresponds to the pooling equilibrium in the 
sense that both bad and good projects are kept alive. If the shareholder 
observes a book value different from unity, continuation is the shareholder’s 
dominant strategy as the diagram shows.
The above explanation forms the basic intuition for the pooling equilib­
rium in theorem 7. Now we can proceed with the formal proof.
Proof. In essence, proving that the strategy profile ( / ,  h) constitutes a Nash 
Equilibrium is equivalent to proving that the strategy of each agent is the 
best response to that of the other agent (that is /  and h are the best mutual 
responses). To aid comprehension, we organize the proof into a number of 
steps.
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Figure 10: The shareholder’s strategy in the pooling equilibrium
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Step 1 : If pi doesn’t fall into the uninformed-window (that is, pi € 
[—a ,—a'] U [a7, a]), the shareholder knows pi perfectly. Hence, there is no 
inefficiency due to market opaqueness or the accounting regime. Hence, it 
suffices to focus the discussion only on pi e  [—a7, a'].
Step 2: Consider the shareholder’s strategy. Essentially the shareholder’s 
decision to continue or liquidate is about the trade-off between liquidating 
the project at date T\ and delaying liquidation until time T2 . Thus he needs 
to compare the time-Xi market value of the project with its expected time-X2 
market value. The project’s market value at Xi is M V ( =  l - ( l - f p i )  =  1+pi- 
If the manager delays liquidation until time X2 , the project’s X^-market value 
includes two parts. The first part is the portion of the project the manager 
liquidated at Xi. This is in the form of cash, which was converted before 
X2_. Its value is a  (1 -I- pi). The other part is the one the manager chooses 
to hold. Its value at T2 is (1 — a) (1  +  pi) (1 -I- <72). Hence the total market 
value at X2 is MV2 =  at (1 +  pi) +  (1 — a)  (1 +  pi) (1 +  P2 ). Therefore, the 
expectation of the difference in payoff between the two alternative choices is
E [M V 2 - M V 1) =  E [ ( l - a ) ( l  +  g i)g 2\
=  (1 - a ) { \  +  gi )pgi  (23)
Prom equation (23), we can see that the shareholder’s decision exclusively 
depends on the fundamentals pi. However, while the manager knows the fun­
damental value of the firm, the shareholder merely receives some information 
about it through the disclosure of accounts (that is the book value). The
91
book value thus serves as a signal of the fundamentals. It reflects the decision 
of the manager, which in turn is a function of the fundamentals. Specifically, 
the book value is given by
B \ i  =  a  (1 +  gi) +  (1 -  a) =  1 +  agi (24)
Now we can discuss the shareholder’s strategy, the function actions  =  
h (B V i). There are three cases for BV\\ i) BV\ >  1, ii) BV\ <  1 and iii) 
B \ i =  1. In cases i) and ii), the shareholder can perfectly infer the sign of the 
economic fundamentals from the book value. Given that a  is non-negative, 
we have
BVi >  1 = »  gi >  0 (25)
BVi <  1 = *  gi <  0 (26)
Substituting (25) and (26) into (23) and considering the manager’s equi­
librium strategy a  =  f  (gi) ^  1 , we obtain
BV\ >  1 = >  E  [MV2 -  M V i] >  0  (27)
BVi <  1 = >  E  [MV2 -  M V l] <  0  (28)
From (27) and (28), we can get the shareholder’s optimal strategy (that 
is his best response to the manager’s strategy) in cases i) and ii). That is,
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continue =  h (BV i) when B \ \  >  1 and liquidate =  h (B V i) when B \ \  <  1.
The more complicated part is case iii) when the book value equals unity. 
In this case, there are two things that can happen, either g\ =  0 or a  =  0. 
In fact, whatever the fundamentals are, the book value will equal unity if 
the manager holds fully. The shareholder cannot perfectly infer the funda­
mentals. However, given the manager’s strategy, the shareholder knows that 
the manager chooses a  =  0 if and only if g\ G [—a', a] U [a, a ']. Hence, the 
expected net payoff from continuing the project conditional on a book value 
of unity is
E  [MV2 -  M V i | BVi =  1 ]
=  E [(  1 -f £ i) pg\ | BV i =  1]
/  9l=a 9i-a' \
= v+a-s I f  i 1 +  9 i)  pa idgi +  (1 + 51) pgidgi J
2a '4 -g  [ l a '3 -  s (“3 -  a 3) -  5 (“2 -  fi2)] (29)
From (29), we get the condition for the manager to continue the project
conditional on the book value equal to unity. That is,
E  [MV:2 ~  M V ! | BVi =  1] >  0 «=> a' >  a* (30)
where a* =  [ |  (a2 — a2) +  \  (a3 — a3) ] 1 .
In theorem 7, we assume a' >  a*, hence the shareholder will continue
with the project, which results in the pooling equilibrium. So far, we have 
shown that actions  =  h(BV i) is indeed the shareholder’s best response to
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the manager’s strategy.
Step 3: Now consider the manager’s strategy. The manager’s information 
is the fundamental return g\. Suppose the realized return is non-negative 
<71 >  0, then the book value BV\ =  1 -f agi will be greater or equal to 
unity since a  is non-negative. The analysis shows that the book value will 
be at least unity whatever the non-negative a  the manager chooses when 
9 i >  0. Considering that the shareholder’s strategy is to continue the project 
if the book value is not less than unity, the manager needs not be concerned 
with the shareholder’s liquidation of the project. The manager’s objective is 
equivalent to maximizing expected utility, which is a function of his bonus 
at T2 - .  The bonus is proportional to the firm’s profit, which is the difference 
between the book value at T2 -  and To (that is the initial cost). We begin by 
analyzing the book value at T2 - ,  denoted BV2 - .  As we have already shown 
in step 2, the market value of the project at T2 is M V 2  =  a ( l  +  <71) +  (1 — 
a ) ( l  +  5 i ) ( l  +  9 2 )- Moreover, we know that the market value of the project 
at T2 -  is M V 2 -  =  MV2 . We must have
BV 2-  =  m a x {B V u M V2- }
=  BV i +  max {0 , M V2-  -  B V i}  (31)
The intuition behind equation (31) is as follows. At T2 -  when the man­
ager leaves the firm, he has another opportunity to trade. He can choose to 
sell or hold the remainder of the project that is still “alive” (that is the por­
tion of project that was not liquidated at Ti). At that date, if he chooses not
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to sell, the book value BV2 -  will equal the book value at the previous date 
(that is BVi). This means the manager can report a book value at T2 -  of at 
least BVi. This is his “floor”. The manager chooses not to sell at T2 -  when 
the market value at that date, M V 2 - ,  is lower than BV\. It is then optimal 
for him to hold everything. Alternatively, if the market value M V 2 -  is higher 
than BV\ , he will sell the remainder of the project to realize its market value. 
Hence we can express the book value BV 2 -  as shown in equation (31). This 
equation also highlights the feature that the historic-cost-accounting regime 
gives the manager a free call option (that is a floor plus a call option). The 
idea behind the option feature of historic cost accounting is as in our analysis 
above: the manager can choose to sell (that is exercise the option) to make 
the book value reflect the market value when the market price is high. In 
addition, he can choose to hold (that is not exercise the option) to keep the 
book value unchanged when the market price is low.
Substituting MV2 -  and BV i into (31), we obtain
BV2-  -  max {B V \ , MV 2 - }
=  max {1 +  a g i ,a  (1 -I- <71) +  (1 — a) (1 +  <71) (1 +  <72)} (32)
Therefore, the profit of the firm at 7 *2-  is
PF 2-  =  BV2 - - B V 0
=  max{l + a g i ,a { \  + g{) +  (1 — cn)(l + <7i)(l + <72)} — 1 (33)
Since we are concerned with the situation g\ >  0 , from (33) we have
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PF 2-  >  0  (34)
It is worth noting that the compensation structure has the characteristic of 
“limited liability”, which means that the shareholder cannot pay a negative 
bonus in the case of a loss. Fortunately, however, we can see from (34) that 
the profit is always non-negative in our model. Hence the limited-liability 
constraint is never binding.
Suppose the manager’s bonus is a proportion j3 >  0 of the profit. The 
bonus is then equal to
B N  =  B P F i-  =  /?*[max{l +  a g i , a ( l + g i )  +  (1 -  a ) ( l  +  fli)(l +  g i)}  -  1]
(35)
Substituting (35) into the manager’s utility function, we obtain his expected 
utility
E U  =  E[ U( BN) ]  
=  E [ U  (ft • PF 2-)}
=  E [ U ( P  • [m ax{l +  agi,
a( 1 +  Si) +  (1 -  a ) ( l  +  S i) ( l  +  S2 )} -  1])] (36)
Recall that the manager’s utility function is U( W)  =  1 — e~k'w . In order 
to save parameters, we can use an equivalent optimization scheme to replace
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the original one by replacing k with k(3
max E U  
a€[0,l]
max E  [U • [max {1 +  agi, a ( l  +  gx) +  (1 -  a ) ( l  +  p i) ( l  +  g2)} -  1])]
£*€[0,1]
max E [ U  (ft -m a x {l +  agx, a { \  +  gx) +  (1 -  c*)(l +  £ i) ( l  +  0 2 )})] (37)
q€[0 ,1]
where k is scaled up by (3.
Basically, equation (37) shows that the manager’s maximizing utility
based on his bonus is equivalent to his maximizing utility based on book
value. Hence we obtain the optimal strategy for the manager when gx >  0,
that is, /  (gi) =  argmaxE [17 (m ax{l +  a g i , a ( l + g i )  +  (1 -  a ) ( l  +  # i) ( l  +  <72)})] 
ae[0,l]
when gi >  0 .
Finally, we need to show that the manager’s optimal strategy is to sell 
nothing when g\ <  0. By BV i =  1 +  ag \, if the manager sets a  to be 
positive, B V 1 <  1 . Following the argument in step 2 , the shareholder will 
liquidate the firm immediately after observing BV\ < 1 .  If this situation 
happens, the market value of the firm is realized and the manager’s bonus 
will be paid based on the firm’s liquidation value. The liquidation value 
however is M V\ =  1 +  g\ <  1, which means that the manager will receive 
no bonus. This is not the manager’s optimal strategy. In fact, he can do 
better by setting a  =  0, which makes the book value at Ti equal unity. In 
this case, the shareholder lets the project continue according to his optimal
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strategy. The manager prefers this strategy of holding (that is a  =  0) for 
two reasons. First, if he can make the shareholder continue with the project, 
the manager receives a valuable “call option” and his bonus will be non­
negative. The option comes from the fact that there is a positive probability 
of the project’s “recovery” at date T2 - .  If recovery does occur, the manager 
can sell the project at that date thus making a profit and earning a bonus. 
Even if “recovery” does not transpire and the firm’s performance worsens, the 
shareholder can choose to hold the project at T2 -  setting the book value to 
at least unity. Therefore, the manager has an incentive to keep the project 
“alive”. The second reason follows from the assumption that the manager 
derives some private benefit from continuing the project. This means that 
even though the manager knows perfectly that the project will not recover 
and may even worsen, he still prefers not to divest the project early since 
he can reap the private benefit in this case. He will also be employed for 
another year and receive his guaranteed base salary. In sum, the manager’s 
strategy is to set a  =  0  when g\ < 0 , that is, /(<7i) — 0  when g\ <  0 .
Step 4: In this step, we will show a and a do exist so that the manager 
indeed holds fully when g\ is high enough (that is g\ >  a) and will sell 
partially when g\ is fairly high. That is, we need to show there do exist 
such optimal as that make the book value a bell-shaped function of g \ . The 
mechanism can be explained as follows. As we showed in step 2 , the manager 
holds fully when g\ <  0  due to his strategic concern that the shareholder 
would liquidate the project if he was to sell. However, we would ideally 
like to know the intuition for his choice to hold fully even when the return 
is very high. There are two reasons. One is the growth opportunity. The
98
high return in first period means that the expected return in the second 
period will be high. Second, as we argued in step 3, the manager has an 
option at date T2 - .  However only if he holds the project can he keep this 
option alive. Hence he has an incentive to hold the project. However, why 
does the manager prefer to sell partially rather than hold fully when the 
fundamentals are fairly good? This is due to another two factors that will 
make the decision tend in the opposite direction (that is favor selling). One 
is that the manager is risk-averse. His decision to hold or sell is equivalent 
to making a portfolio choice. Selling the asset will increase his position in 
the risk-free asset (that is cash) while holding the project is analogous to 
investing in the risky asset. The standard trade-off induces the manager to 
sell partially (that is investing some amount in the risk-free asset) when g\ 
(the expected return of the risky asset) is not very high. The second force, 
which makes the manager sell a bit more, is the “floor”, which is analyzed in 
step 3. The more the manager sells, the higher the book value the manager 
will have at T\ . This increases the floor in the book value at T2 - , which is 
valuable to the manager.
This concludes the proof of theorem 7. □
Theorem 7 presents the pooling equilibrium that occurs in less trans­
parent markets. However, the more transparent the financial market is, the 
more independent the shareholder will be of the manager’s accounting re­
port. The manager will have less opportunity to mask the firm’s performance 
by pooling the bad with the good project. This change could lead to the 
second kind of equilibrium - a separating equilibrium. We state this result
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in theorem 8 .
T heorem  8 . (Separating Equilibrium) When a <  a! <  a*(b, p, k), the strat­
egy profile s =  ( / ,  h) constitutes a Nash Equilibrium, where f  and h are given 
by
f { 9 i )  =  <
max < a r g  max E  [U (max {1 + a g i , a(l + pi) + (1 — a)(l + pi)(l +  P 2 ) } ) ] , e 
[ a€[0,l]
when gi >  0 
0  when  pi <  0
and 
h(BVi )  =  {
continue when B \ \  >  1
> x 2bk(i+u) = Q  <™d a sat-
liquidate when B \ \  <  1 
where £ is a small positive number infinitely close to zero (we can also
define it by  ^ =  + 0 0 ), a* =  [ |(a 2 — a2) +  ^(a3 — a3)] 5, a solves
e -fc ( i+ a )( i+ p a + 6 ) . +  +  +  6) ] _
e - k ( l + a ) ( l + p a - b )  . []_ +  ^  +  a)(ap -  6)] 
i s f ie s -k a e -k^ ± i ^ 0 ^ 1 ± i l + ^ ^ [e-H i+m + m +» - e-k + k ^ +gL){m+ 
f y e - k ( l + a ) ( l + p a + b )  +  fc a e -fe ]  =  0 .
The emergence of the separating equilibrium is due to the uninformed 
window being shorter now. The manager can no longer pool the bad with 
the good project. It is worth noting that both the shareholder’s strategy and 
the manager’s strategy will change in the separating equilibrium compared 
with their actions in the pooling equilibrium. As for the shareholder, he is 
going to liquidate rather than continue the project after observing a book 
value of unity. The manager changes his strategy to selling a tiny proportion 
of the project to signal to the shareholder that the project is good when it
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is indeed good.
Figure 11 describes the result of the separating equilibrium. The top dia­
gram is the shareholder’s book value information. Suppose the manager still 
adopts his optimal strategy from the pooling equilibrium (that is sending no 
signal to the shareholder). The book value then corresponds to the dashed 
line in the diagram. If this is the case, conditional on the book value of unity, 
the shareholder’s potential gain from continuation (the area of AABC plus 
ADEFG) is dominated by the potential loss from early liquidation (the area 
AAJK). This is due to the uninformed window being shorter now (a' <  a*). 
Note that a* is the threshold (that is AABC +  ADHIG =  AALM). There­
fore, the shareholder’s optimal strategy is to liquidate the project conditional 
on a book value of unity. The manager’s strategy will change as well. He 
will signal to the shareholder by showing a book value infinitesimally higher 
than unity when the economic fundamentals are positive. The solid line in 
the top diagram represents the manager’s signal in terms of the book value. 
Now the shareholder can perfectly distinguish the bad from the good project 
and first-best efficiency can be achieved.
Proof. The proof of theorem 8  is rather easy as we only need to compare 
the agents’ strategies in the separating equilibrium with those in the pooling 
equilibrium. The change of the shareholder’s strategy in the separating equi­
librium is his action deviation when he observes a book value of unity. Since 
the uninformed window is shorter now (that is a' <  a* (6 , p, k)), condition 
(30) is no longer satisfied. The shareholder will liquidate the project anyhow. 
The idea behind this argument is as follows. Although the shareholder knows
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Figure 11: The shareholder’s strategy in the separating equilibrium
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the project may be very good conditional on a book value of unity, the loss 
from a poor project dominates the gain from a promising project. Hence, 
it is optimal for the shareholder to liquidate the project. It is very impor­
tant to note that the manager’s strategy also changes when the shareholder’s 
strategy does. Conditional on the manager’s selling nothing giving rise to a 
book value of unity, the manager knows that the shareholder will liquidate 
the project even if there is chance of it being good. Hence the manager will 
have to adapt his strategy in order to maximize his payoff: he will send an 
inimitable signal to the shareholder that the project is good when indeed the 
economic fundamentals are good by selling a tiny fraction e of the project 
to push the book value slightly above unity. Hence the /  (<71) is the best 
response of the manager to the shareholder’s strategy. Now we can go back 
and check that the shareholder’s strategy is still the best response to the 
manager’s updated strategy. This is in fact obvious. Given the manager’s 
strategy, the shareholder knows the book value equals unity if and only if 
gi <  0. Now it is even more certain that the shareholder will liquidate the 
project in this case. □
I Implications
In this section, we analyze the model implications by a series of propositions. 
From theorems 7 and 8 , we know that in more opaque financial markets the 
manager is better able to use historic cost accounting to pool bad with good 
projects. This hinders the shareholder from discerning the bad project at 
an early stage. The bad project can then potentially worsen in quality over
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time. The poor performance can accumulate and only eventually surface 
leading to a big crash in the asset price. This is the relationship between 
market transparency and the asset price crash.
P ro p o sitio n  9. Under the historic-cost-accounting regime, a higher degree 
of opaqueness leads to more frequent and more severe asset price crashes.
The result of proposition 9 is consistent with the findings in Myers and 
Jin (2006). Our contribution is that we provide a new mechanism that 
explains the cause of the empirical evidence. In other words, the historic 
cost accounting regime can provide a tool for the manager to hide the firm’s 
true performance, a scenario that can potentially lead to a crash.
Figure 12 gives a numerical example. On the horizontal axis we plot 
a' (that is the width of the uninformed window) and on the vertical axis 
A s (that is the degree of the crash in the book value). The graph shows 
that more opaque financial markets exhibit a higher intensity of book value 
crashes, both in frequency and magnitude.
Proof. See Appendix I. □
Now consider what happens if the marking-to-market regime can be im­
plemented (in sense that the fair value is observable). In this case, the 
shareholder can see through the firm’s performance. He will liquidate the 
firm if e\ — —a* and no crash can happen. Yet there is a crash under historic 
cost accounting if the financial market is sufficiently opaque. This is propo­
sition 1 0 : the relationship between the accounting regime and the asset price 
crash.
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Figure 1 2 : The crash in the asset price.
P rop osition  10. In an opaque financial market (that is a' > a*), more 
severe and more frequent asset price crashes result under historic cost ac­
counting than under marking to market.
Proposition 10 is in the same spirit as proposition 9. We therefore omit 
its proof.
In fact, some practitioner reports have provided evidence in support of 
the implication of proposition 10. As a Bank of England survey states, under 
historic cost accounting the shareholder cannot distinguish the bad from the 
good project at an early stage and hence is unable to prevent a bad project 
from being kept alive and potentially worsening in quality. This is the reason 
for the crash under the historic cost accounting regime while no such crash 
can happen under marking to market. The above argument underlines the 
intuition of proposition 1 0 .
105
As marking-to-market can lead to more efficient liquidation, the bad 
project will have a lower probability to survive over time. The asset price 
at T2  is less volatile under marking to market than under historic cost ac­
counting.
P ro p o sitio n  11. The unconditional volatility of the asset price at T2  is 
higher under historic cost accounting than under marking to m arket
Moreover, the historic-cost-accounting regime not only increases the asset 
price volatility overall but it also transfers it across time in a pattern similar 
to the “Black” effect. As figure 9 shows, under historic cost accounting, 
the lower (higher) the book value at T\, the higher (lower) the uncertainty 
(volatility) about the liquidation value at T2 .
P ro p o sitio n  12. Under historic cost accounting, the asset price exhibits a 
pattern similar to the “Black” effect in the book value.
J Conclusion and discussion
This paper analyzes the economic consequences of historic cost accounting for 
the financial market. Using a theoretical model we can (partially) answer 
the following two questions: what kind of inefficiency can a historic-cost- 
accounting regime cause and what is the mechanism that produces these 
inefficiencies? Our model shows that under historic cost accounting the 
opaqueness of the financial market can lead to the inefficient continuation 
of the project by the shareholder, which in turn leads to more pronounced 
asset price crashes, both in frequency and magnitude. However, under the
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marking-to-market regime, if the fair value is indeed available, these crashes 
will not happen. Our model also shows that historic cost accounting can 
change the asset price volatility. In fact, it transfers asset price volatility 
across time while increasing volatility overall. The mechanism of historic 
cost accounting to produce the above effects lies in the book value’s con­
vexity in the economic fundamentals. However low the market price is, the 
manager can make the book value equal to the initial cost (the floor) by 
holding the asset. At the same time, he can participate in the upside of the 
market valuation by selling. The convexity in the book value is equivalent 
to granting the manager a free call option. When accounting-value-based 
compensation is used (which is quite common in reality), the manager has 
both the capability and the incentive to use this option. This will lead to 
inefficiencies.
Finally, we admit that our results should be interpreted with caution 
since our results are based on a specific setup. It is impossible for us to 
explore all aspects of the features of historic cost accounting and all aspects 
of the effects of historic cost accounting. Notably, in the analysis of the equi­
libria and their implications, we assume that the manager’s compensation 
structure is composed of a base salary plus a profit-based bonus. We use this 
assumption because such compensation structure is widely used in practice, 
particularly in some industries like financial services. One of the most impor­
tant reasons why many firms do not use market-value-based compensation 
under historic cost accounting in reality is that the market may be not very 
liquid, which makes the fair value unavailable. In this case, market-price- 
based compensation may cause more inefficiency. Also, the market price
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is likely to be very volatile and the market not efficient. Nevertheless, if 
the shareholder implements a very complicated compensation structure, this 
may reduce some inefficiency of the historic cost accounting regime.38
However, our argument is that many theoretical compensation structures 
are hardly feasible in reality, particularly given the illiquidity and inefficiency 
of many financial markets. In order to highlight and model the effects of his­
toric cost accounting on a market with such features, we have abstracted 
away from the complicated optimal compensation design by using the com­
pensation structure that is most common in reality. We believe our main 
findings are robust.
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Appendix
P ro o f o f P roposition  9
Consider the change in the share price between Ti and X2 in different financial 
markets. Here we suppose that the ex-post returns in period 1 and 2  are 
£ 1  =  —a' and £ 2  =  —b respectively, that is, the lowest returns are realized. 
We consider this situation for the purpose of exploring the asset price change 
in extreme cases (that is the worst outcome). Note that when £ 1  falls outside 
the uninformed window (e.g. —a < £ <  —a'), the shareholder can observe 
the return. Hence the lowest ex-post return that the shareholder cannot 
observe is £ 1  =  — a'.
A transparent financial market: a' <  a*. In such a market, the whole 
project will be liquidated at T \. Hence there is no change in the share price 
between T\ and T2 .
A s  =  s i — S2  =  0  (38)
Here we assume that if the project is liquidated early at Ti, the firm 
value at T2 equals its liquidation value (e.g. all the cash generated from 
liquidation is retained within the firm until date T2 ). Therefore, the firm 
value does not change in the second period.
An opaque financial market: a' >  a*. In such a market, the manager is 
able to pool bad with good projects by exploiting the shareholder’s ignorance 
of the project’s true quality leading the shareholder to potentially continue 
both types of projects. The book value is unity. Hence the share price is the
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discounted expected market value of the firm at T2 conditional on the book 
value at T\ being unity, that is,
s i  =  E  [MV2 I BV i =  1]
— E  [(1 +  9i) (1 +  P9i +  £2 ) | BV1 =  1] 
1
2  a' +  a — a 
1
2 a' +  a — a
/ a ra(1 +  9i) (1 +  P9i) dgi  +  I (1 +  gi)  (1 +  pgi) dg\
■a' J  a
[ |p a 3 +  \  (1  +  p) a2 +  a] -  [ - \p a ' z +  \  (1  +  p) a '2 -  a'] 
+  [\pa'z +  \  (1  +  p) a'2 +  a'] — [ - |p a 3 +  \  (1  +  p) a2 -  a]
The share price at T2 is the firm’s liquidation value at that date given by
S2 =  ( l  -  a!) ( l  -  pa! — b)
Therefore, the price change is equal to
A s =  S i  — S2 =
1
2 a' +  a — a
[ \p a 3 +  \  (1  +  p) a2 +  a]
“  [ - \ P a 'Z +  5 ( !  +  P) fl/2 “  a 1  
+  [\ p a '3 + | ( 1  +  p) a '2 +  a']
-  [~^pa3 +  | ( 1  +  p) a2 -  a] ^
— ( l  — a') ( l  — pa' — b) (39)
Putting (38) and (39) together, we obtain A s, which measures the extent 
of the asset price crash, as a function of a', which measures the degree of
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market opaqueness:
0 a' e  [0, a*]
>
[jpa3 -(-  ^(1 +  p) a? +  flj
A s =  / (ar) =  < _______ • d2 a'+a—a
+  [^/oa/3 +   ^(1 +  p) a'2 +  ax] 
-  [ ~ \ p a z +  | ( 1  +  p)a? - a ]
/
— (1 — a') (1 — pa' — b)
With the setup of the parameters in our model, A s  is an increasing
the more opaque financial market will display more severe crashes. Moreover, 
A s is a discontinuous function of a' in the whole interval [0, a]. When a' <  a*, 
there is no crash at all. This discontinuity means that opaqueness will not 
only lead to more severe but also more frequent asset price crashes. This idea 
will become clearer if we consider the case of multiple projects. Suppose there 
are many projects in each financial market, the length of the uninformed 
window of these projects in the same financial market is different but centered 
around a' of their own financial market. Hence we can expect that the 
financial market with a higher a' will have more projects falling within the 
interval (a*,a], resulting in a higher frequency of crashes.
function of a' when the crash occurs (that is a G (a*,a]),  which means that
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N otes
1The seminal paper on bank runs is due to Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
2The attentive reader will notice that the game structures in our setup and the bankrob- 
ber case are not the same. Our setup as expained later is a coordination game while the 
bankrobber example has a prisoners’ dilemma structure. We use the outcome of the fa­
miliar prisoners’ dilemma only to intuitively illustrate the forces at work that produce a 
run outcome.
3A possible interpretation of the asset could be short-lived information that requires 
the input of both parties to decipher and reveal its value.
4 Other papers argue that bank fragility may not be entirely undesirable as it disciplines 
managers (Calomiris and Kahn (1991), Flannery and Kaufman (1996), Diamond and 
Rajan Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001a,b,c)). For a comprehensive literature survey on 
bank failures see Wagner (2009b).
5 However, even with uncorrelated risks, a level of diversification that is optimal for a 
single institution may be suboptimal for the system (Wagner (2008, 2009a)).
6We choose the parameters of the distribution of A to minimize the probability of a 
negative asset price.
rThe breach of the price constraint may be due to additional supply of the asset by 
noise traders who sell upon observing a price drop. We abstract away from the micro 
foundations that could give rise to the fixed payout b.
8See for instance Financial Times, November 13, 2008.
9See The Economist, March 26, 2009.
10See Bloomberg, March 19, 2009.
11 When interpreting cross investments in terms of stakes in a mutual investment fund, 
the correct exposure of trader i in the fund is his relative stake given by ;•
12 The tone in this paper may suggest to the reader that we view more information as 
desirable for shareholders. The literature has identified circumstances when more infor­
mation is not necessarily desirable. While this paper does not take a stance on this, one 
reason why shareholders may prefer more information is the opportunity to take correc­
tive action that increases firm value when managers have not acted in the best interest of
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shareholders.
13Bushman and Indjejikian (1995) also consider corporate disclosures and insider trading 
but differ from our model in that they introduce information acquisition. Fan (2007), John 
and Lang (1991) and Gomes (2000) study two-dimensional signaling models of insider 
trading and dividend announcements/earnings management/resource diversion.
14Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find evidence that managers whose compensation is 
more sensitive to share price manipulate earnings more, and sell large quantities of shares 
after manipulating their earnings upward.
15A number of papers has shown that corporate insider trades are associated with 
subsequent stock returns, which indicates that insiders trade upon private information 
not reflected in stock price (e.g. Givoly and Palmon (1985), Lakonishok and Lee (2001), 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2002, 2005), Seyhun (1986), Roze and Zaman (1998)).
16One may interpret the disclosure setup as misstatements by the manager (in the sense 
of presenting more good or bad news than is known to him) receiving an infinite penalty 
ex post. Kartik (2008) studies communication games with finite lying costs.
17The outcome of a project can be interpreted as the profitability of a division within a 
firm.
18 This assumption allows us to study the information revelation role of disclosures and 
insider trading in isolation of any incentive effects related to investments.
19Disclosure models with verifiable reports were introduced by Grossman (1981) and 
Milgrom (1981), and generalized by Seidmann and Winter (1997).
20Imposing this constraint is equivalent to assuming a less restrictive message space and 
an infinite cost of lying (reporting more successes or failures than were actually observed). 
It is in this sense that the verifiable reports game is a (degenerate) version of a signaling 
game.
21 Our holding cost is similar to the transaction cost in the signaling game of DeMarzo 
and Duffie (1999). Alternative interpretations of the discount factor are the time and 
in particular the risk preferences of managers. The qualitative predictions of the model 
should be similar. The model by Leland and Pyle (1977) is based on this assumption. 
Since a large fraction of a manager’s wealth is closely tied to and positively correlated
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with firm value through his human capital, portfolio theory predicts that managers prefer 
to divest their holdings in the firm to diversify. Costly incomplete diversification through 
the retainer of an equity stake can thus signal positive information about the firm. In 
such signaling models, the signaling cost is determined by managerial risk aversion, an 
unobservable parameter. Since the discount factor in our model is assumed to be common 
knowledge and identical across managers, we prefer the interpretation of a holding cost.
22We abuse notation here by suppressing the mutual dependence of the share trade and 
the firm value message.
23 Pooling of this kind has also been studied by Lewis and Sappington (1993), Austen- 
Smith (1994) and Shin (1994).
24We rule out short selling and share purchases. Short selling by insiders is prohibited 
in the United States under SEC Rule 16 (c). We believe excluding share purchases does 
not alter our results. Share purchases would not occur in equilibrium for instance for a 
sufficiently low holding cost.
25 The Economist, 23-29 October 2004, p.83.
26In fact, even if we don’t interpret HC accounting as its pure form, HC accounting 
with LCM still differs from MTM; they have quite different economic consequences. HC 
accounting with LCM can only reveal a decrease and not an increase in the asset value 
(conservative principle). Specifically, a company (and its investors) may well consider a 
project that earns a low positive return a failure. The investors may want it liquidated and 
have the resources redeployed. However, under HC accounting with LCM, the investors 
cannot distinguish a low positive return from a very high positive return. Hence they 
would not be able to tell that the asset is earning a sub-standard return. With MTM 
accounting, they would be able to. In other words, even if LCM is applied stringently, it 
provides managers a veil in some cases whereas MTM never does.
27At the same time, this timing setup highlights the fact that a longer-dated model is 
unsuitable for our purposes (we will explain the last two points later on). This timing 
setup is thus the most tractable one.
28We assume this project is divisible. Take the example of a supermarket chain that 
operates outlets in different locations. Should the company decide to part with some or
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all of its branches, the latter could be sold off as a whole, in groups or individually. An 
outsider would only be able to see the total transaction value but be unable to put a price 
on the individual branches. He would simply lack the expertise (firm-specific project) or 
find it uneconomical to do so (high cost).
29The assumption of positive autocorrelation can also be justified by empirical evidence 
(e.g. GDP growth, as an aggregate performance measure of numerous small projects, over 
the business cycle) and on theoretical grounds (e.g. stage financing in the venture capital 
industry as an optimal contract due to sequential information revelation).
30 The shorter lifetime of the manager is also one of the reasons for the inefficiency of 
historic cost accounting in Plantin, Shin, and Sapra (2008).
31The intrinsic value is the value realized if the project is liquidated in the market.
32 In the extension part of this paper, we are going to consider share-price-based com­
pensation.
33 However, if the shareholder decides to liquidate the whole project at T i, we assume 
that the manager is paid based on the profit at T\ , which equals the liquidation value less 
the initial cost.
34The PSS paper also assumes that the agent’s aim is to maximize the accounting value.
35It is worth noting that even if these two items could be disentangled on the balance 
sheet, this can only occur when a  ^  0. Therefore, if the manager’s strategy in the 
equilibrium is to choose a  =  0 for a very low g i , then shareholders cannot infer g\ even 
under the assumption that the balance sheet reports cash separately.
36In our context, the unobservability of the project’s market value for the shareholder 
is due to its firm-specific nature and the heterogeneity of its parts. Take the example of 
the supermarket chain. In the case of a sale of a number of outlets that are regionally 
dispersed, for instance, the unit sale values are not known to the outsider, only the total 
sale value is. Although the outlets are likely to be identically equipped, the location factor 
is likely to drive a wedge between their individual sale values. Knowing or determining 
these values is not realistically possible for the outsider or only at a prohibitive cost. 
The inseparability of the proportion of the project sold and its growth rate, and thus the 
unobservability of the project’s market value, is the crucial difference between historic
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cost accounting and marking to market. If the outsider could observe the growth rate and 
the proportion of the project sold individually, historic cost accounting would be just as 
informative as marking to market, making them identical.
37Purther, as the referee pointed out, we can also interpret the opaqueness measure a' 
as an LCM hurdle under historic cost accounting regime in reality.
38 Our basic argument is that under historic cost accounting, share-price-based compen­
sation is more efficient than accounting-value-based compensation if the stock market is 
sufficiently efficient. However under marking to market, accounting-value-based compen­
sation is an improvement over share-price-based compensation if the stock market is not 
liquid enough. Basically, given two accounting schemes and two compensation schemes, 
there are four pairwise combinations between the accounting regime and the compensation 
scheme: (1) historic cost accounting regime and accounting-value-based compensation, (2) 
historic cost accounting regime and share-price-based compensation, (3) marking to mar­
ket and accounting-value-based compensation, (4) marking to market share-price-based 
compensation. We argue that combinations (2) and (3) are more efficient them (1) and 
(4). Intuitively, (1) and (4) make the performance measure endogenous. Since the man­
ager can influence the performance measure, which determines his pay, higher inefficiency 
ensues. Combination (1) is the focus of our paper. As we show, historic cost accounting 
provides the manager with a free option to increase the book value without requiring any 
effort from the manager. If the manager is remunerated based on book value, he has 
an incentive to use this free option. This will lead to inefficiency. A similar story holds 
for combination (4). If marking to market and a share-price-based measure are used to 
determine compensation, the share price will not longer be exogenous. This is so because 
the manager can influence the share pice to some degree himself. If his remuneration is 
simultaneously based on the share price, the manager has an incentive to inflate the share 
price to increase his compensation, which also leads to inefficiency.
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